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Abstract
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters of Science in
Fire Protection Engineering, a prescriptive and performance-based analysis was
performed on a building housing the Center for the Arts. The building was constructed in
1947 in California as an automobile dealership and repair shop under the provisions of
the then-controlling Uniform Building Code.

It subsequently underwent several

occupancy changes and has since served as a beauty school, gymnastics center, and
currently as a performing and visual arts center.
Prescriptive analyses were conducted based primarily upon the provisions of the
2010 California Building and Fire Codes, and the 2009 edition of NFPA 101, Life Safety
Code. Where required, other NFPA codes such as the 2010 editions of NFPA 13,
Automatic Sprinkler Systems Handbook and NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and
Signaling Code were also referenced.
The overall fire protection system was divided into subsystems and then
examined.

Subsystems included those involving safe egress, fire detection and

notification, water-based suppression and structural fire protection. Results are provided
with respect to each.
The performance based analyses focused primarily upon the ability of occupants
to safely escape the building after the onset of various fire events.

The computer fire

model, “Fire Dynamics Simulator”, was used to estimate the available safe egress times
of occupants under various fire scenarios.

The required times needed for safe egress
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were determined based upon calculation methods set forth in the Society of Fire
Protection Engineering Handbook.

Available and required safe egress times were

compared for each of the different fire scenarios.
Where deficiencies in fire protection systems were noted in the existing building
layout and arrangements, recommendations for improvements are provided herein. It
should be noted that these recommendations are considered a best effort and are
presumed technically valid. Even so, any changes or upgrades made based upon these
recommendations must still be reviewed and approved by a licensed professional fire
protection engineer and the local authority having jurisdiction.
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Project Scope
Background
Fire protection analyses of buildings are
performed to evaluate the level of protection from fire afforded to both life and property.
Such protection may come from both passive and active systems associated with a
particular facility as well as through proper procedures. Complete fire safety is extremely
difficult if not impossible to design into a building and its operations since fire risk
cannot be completely eliminated. It is the responsibility of building stakeholders such as
owners and occupants as well as designers, builders and officials having jurisdiction to
ensure fire safety objectives for a particular facility are established and pursued to
provide a minimum acceptable level of safety of life and property from fire as well as to
prepare for continuity of operations in the event of a fire.

Prescriptive Based Analysis
Prescriptive or specification-oriented codes and regulations such as building and
fire codes exist to provide guidance for design and operational factors that have been
shown to offer an acceptable level of safety. Such codes have been developed over time
and changes to their contents regularly occur in response to changes in building materials,
procedures and designs as well as to fire incidents shown to require modifications.
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Further, changes in building designs, occupancies and uses over time often lead to
modifications to building and fire protection systems required by applicable codes.
This prescriptive-based analysis is intended to examine the current state of fire
protection to persons and property associated with the Center for the Arts. Changes in
the building, its occupancy and its operation since being built almost 60 years ago have
been outpaced by changes to the codes that existed at the time of construction.
Evaluation of the current state of fire protection will afford the owners and operators a
look at the current risks to life and property as well as the protections afforded to
occupants, clients and visitors. It will also compare facets of the existing levels of
protection with those required of new buildings.
The state of fire protection at the Center for the Arts was evaluated against several
prescriptive codes. Those include: the 2010 editions of the California Building Code
(CBC) and the California Fire Code (CFC); the 2009 edition of NFPA 101, the Life
Safety Code (LSC); the 2010 edition of NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of
Sprinkler Systems; and the 2010 edition of NFPA 72, the National Fire Alarm and
Signaling Code. In the analyses discussed below, other codes or standards will also be
referenced and identified as to their specific applications.
Readers are cautioned not to consider the extent of this evaluation as all-inclusive
in its findings and recommendations but more of an overall summary of present
conditions. Limitations in resources and time available preclude a complete evaluation of
all aspects of the total fire safety picture.
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Performance Based Analysis
In examining the Center for the Arts in terms of a performance-based analysis,
several design fires were devised and considered that represent realistic and possible fire
scenarios that might be anticipated to occur in the building. The extent of these fires and
their threat to life and property have been evaluated in terms of the existing building and
fire protection systems design. While a performance based analysis for a new building
design is more comprehensive, the design fires used to examine the Center for the Arts
address existing conditions and their effect on occupants’ tenability under various fire
scenarios.

Computer fire modeling was used to estimate conditions that would affect

that tenability.

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

3

Prescriptive Analysis
Building Description

The Center for the Arts is a privately owned and operated performing arts center.
It occupies a building completed in 1947 and built of Type III construction, commonly
referred to as “Ordinary Construction”. The structure’s original function was quite
different that its current use. From 1947 until 1984 it served as an automobile dealership
and repair facility. It consisted of an indoor showroom at the south, offices above, and a
mechanical repair facility to the north. Auto painting and body-shop repair spaces were
added years later to the north.
The Center for the Arts is presently classified under the Life Safety Code (LSC)
as a mixed occupancy building with specific occupancies for assembly, business and
storage. It contains two theaters, one with 170 fixed and several portable seats and the
other, a smaller day-theater known as the “Off Center Stage” with about 60 portable
seats.
The building is oriented in a north-south direction and measures approximately
262 feet long and 72 feet wide at its limits. It is built on a sloping hillside that rises to the
west. A perimeter foundation with fill supports the concrete slab floor. The front of the
building opens onto a public street at the south. The northern, narrower portion of the
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building opens to a private parking lot at the north and west of the property that in turn
borders and empties onto a public street to the north.

Figure 1: Front (south) side of the Center for the Arts
The building consists of two floors in the front (south), a tall, single-story space in
the middle section, and a shorter, single story wing further to the rear (north). The total
estimated floor space is approximately 19,000 square feet with approximately 13,900 of
that being on the ground floor. There are no known existing plans for the building.
Measurements referred to herein are based on estimations made from direct observation.
The first floor at the front of the building houses an art gallery, theater lobby and
gathering place, storage spaces, dressing rooms, restrooms and offices. The second floor
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at the front of the building houses an independently operated dance studio, associated
offices, dressing room and a sound studio.

Figure 2: Aerial view of the Center for the Arts (Google, 2013). North is to the left.

Figure 3: Sketch of building layout from southwest with roof shown in place
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Figure 4: Sketch of building layout viewed from northwest with roof shown in place
The original two-story portion of the building at the front (southern) measures
approximately 72 feet wide by 65 feet deep. Each of the two floors there is about 12 feet
high and fitted with 8-foot high drop ceilings mounted in a metal “t-bar” grid framework.
Exterior walls are concrete-filled, masonry block with some large display windows in the
front. Interior walls are primarily gypsum board over a wooden framework.
North of the front, two-story portion of the building and separated by a 27-foot
high wood-framed wall is single-story section housing the main theater that measures
approximately 72 feet by 75 feet. It is open to the 27-foot high peak of the arched truss
roof. Sidewalls at the base of the roof are about 16 foot high. An open, elevated platform
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of slightly more than 1,000 square feet in the west portion of the theater serves as a stage.
Though used as a stage, the platform it is not so classified by Section 410 of the
California Building Code since it has “…no overhead hanging curtains, drops, scenery or
stage effects other than lighting and sound.” A stage on the other hand is defined as
having “…overhead hanging curtains, drops, scenery or stage effects other than lighting
and sound.” The main floor of the theater is of a slightly elevated wood design likely
installed for cushioning when the building housed a gymnasium in that space.

Figure 5: Main theater platform viewed from the fixed seating area. Note the lack of
overhead curtains leading to the designation as a platform.

Much of the eastern half of the main theater is filled by 170 fixed, loge-type seats
mounted to an enclosed, stepped, wooden framework.
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about 6 feet above the main floor. Just north of the seating area is a part-time lounge
complete with a small bar to serve light food and drink.

Figure 6: Fixed seating in the main theater and portable seats in front. Arched roof
trusses are visible as well as elevated theatrical lighting fixtures.
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Figure 7: Lounge area north of fixed seating in main theater
Two, 12-foot high storage areas/rooms arranged one on top of the other are
located immediately north of the platform/stage and occupy the northwest corner of the
main theater space.

Access to the upper storage is from the north end of the platform

while the lower storage is entered through a garage-door sized opening immediately west
of the lounge area. At the northeast corner of the main theater space are two more
storage rooms that extend approximately fifteen feet north of the north wall of the theater
and mark the original northern extent of the building.
The newer, single-story wing north of the main theater is attached to the eastern
half of the original structure. This wing measures about 30 feet east-west as compared to
the original building’s 72-foot width. It contains four primary spaces that serve as a
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smaller theater, lobby, dressing and accessory rooms and storage. A bow-truss roof tops
this part of the building. The peak of the roof rises to about 16 feet. Sidewalls are about
11 feet high. There are no direct connections for interior passage between the original
building and the newer wing to the north. Access to the northern wing is only through
doors in the west exterior wall.

Figure 8: North wing of the Center for the Arts viewed to the southeast
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Figure 9: Exploded sketch of building viewed from southwest

Figure 10: Exploded sketch of building viewed from northwest
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Figure 11: Rear theater audience seating viewed from the platform/stage
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Egress
Despite all the attempts made to prevent fires in buildings, it is unrealistic to
believe complete fire safety can be fully achieved in public buildings since the risk of fire
can never be eliminated. As a result, a major part of fire prevention efforts is the
application of minimum criteria for egress provisions to allow and foster the timely
escape of occupants from buildings in the event of a fire. Because of the obvious
importance of this aspect of fire prevention, egress analysis of the Center for the Arts is
the first topic to be discussed.
Egress analysis includes examination of a wide array of factors including the type
and numbers of people occupying a building, the uses in which a building might be
expected to be employed, the number, layout and access to exits from a building and
factors that might inhibit the prompt and safe evacuation of occupants through those
exits. Each of these topics is addressed below as they apply to the Center for the Arts.
Lastly, a specific analysis of the Center for the Arts layout is offered in terms of
determining the required safe egress time (RSET). That required time needed to safely
exit will subsequently be compared with the available safe egress time (ASET)
determined in the performance based analysis by evaluating potential fire scenarios.
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Occupancy
Section 302 of the 2010 edition of the California Building Code (CBC) classifies
building occupancy based upon the use of a structure. In instances where there are
multiple uses, building are classified by Section 508 of the CBC as having multiple
occupancies.
The occupancy classifications of the Center for the Arts have changed over time.
Presently, the building meets the definition of a multi-occupancy structure. The various
classifications assigned as part of this analysis include: Assembly (Group A-1) for the
theaters, lobbies/waiting areas, art gallery and dance studios; Business (Group B) for
rooms and areas used for business administration of the facilities; and Storage (Group S1) for those spaces used to store the various equipment, props and theatrical equipment
needed to support various productions and dance studio operations.
The 2009 edition of the Life Safety Code also specifies occupancy classifications
in addition to those set forth in the CBC. Section 6.1.2.1 defines Assembly occupancy as
covering a building or space in which 50 or more persons gather for amusement including
in theaters. Section 6.1.11.1 defines Business occupancies as used for the transaction of
business other than mercantile.

Section 6.1.13.1 defines Storage occupancy as an

occupancy used primarily for the storage or sheltering of goods, merchandise, products,
or vehicles. Each of these generally agrees with the CBC in the broad classifications that
have been assigned to spaces in the Center for the Arts although sub-classifications such
as A-1 or S-1 are not included.
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building
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The Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) over the Center for the Arts are the
local city fire and building departments. Should questions arise as to classifications of
various spaces in the building, Section 6.1.1 of the Life Safety Code assigns the AHJ as
responsible for determining whether the occupancy has been correctly classified.
The distributions of the various occupancy classifications throughout the building
are shown in Figures 12 through 14. In each of the figures, North is to the left. Figure 12
depicts a plan view of the first floor at the front of the building. Figure 13 shows the
northern wing. Figure 14 is for the second floor of the building. The color legend shown
in Table 1 shows the occupancy classifications in terms of colors displayed in the
occupancy diagrams.

Compartment Occupancy Key
Assembly
Business
Storage
Exit Stairs

Table 1: Compartment Occupancy Key
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Figure 12: Occupancy Classification of the Front First Floor Spaces. North is depicted
towards the left.

Occupancy Areas (ft2) by Classification
Occupancy Classification
Area of Building
Front Office / Lobby /
Art Gallery
Main Theater /
Platform/Stage
North (Rear) Wing
Second Floor

Business

Assembly

Storage

1,950

2,410

0

0
560
990

4,450
1,950
2,975

1,550
1,140
270

Table 2: Approximate Building Areas by Occupancy Classification
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Figure 13: Occupancy Classification of the Rear First Floor Spaces. North is depicted
towards the left.

Figure 14: Occupancy Classification of the Second Floor Spaces. North is depicted
towards the left.
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The layout of exits in the Center for the Arts building was established long before
the current occupancy usage began. When the occupancy of the building shifted in about
2002 to that currently in use, the AHJ did not require significant changes as to the
number or arrangement of exits. As a result, in some instances, the remoteness and
location of exits today do not meet the prescriptive code requirements of either the CBC,
CFC or the LSC. Whether a formal waiver was granted by the AHJ is uncertain. Present
day AHJ staff members are aware of the layout of the exits.

Occupancy Load
The building’s overall occupancy load was calculated using Table 7.3.1.2 of the
Life Safety Code based upon occupancy classifications assigned individual spaces.
Though the building is listed as “multiple-occupancy”, its primarily use throughout is
Assembly (A-1). The sizes and occupancy classifications of the various spaces are
detailed in Table 2 and specified in greater detail in Appendix A.
The building’s maximum occupancy was determined to be 1,061 persons. That
consists of 849 persons on the ground floor and 211 on the second floor. For calculation
purposes, the ground floor occupancy was subdivided into three areas including, 1) the
art gallery, 2) the main theater, front lobby and business areas, and 3) the rear theater,
rear lobby and rear storage rooms.

Primary occupancy loading was determined in

accordance with the factors set forth in Table 7.3.1.2 of the LSC. Minor exceptions were
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made specifically as related to restroom capacity (which is not detailed in the LSC) and
areas to the front and sides of the main theater fixed seating.
Some modifications to the maximum occupancy load might be called for based
upon the normal Center for the Arts’ practices. Those modifications relate to the fact that
when the main theater is in use for productions, the areas to the front and side of the fixed
theater seating are, as a matter of practice either void of people or not filled to capacity.
Even so, for purposes of this analysis, each of those areas were considered at maximum
capacity as per the LSC to provide a more conservative estimate of required safe egress
time (RSET).

Adequacy of Exits
The overall adequacy of the number of exits and means of egress was evaluated
using the general provisions of Sections 7.3 through 7.10 of the LSC as well as Chapter
10 of both the CBC and the CFC. Since the requirements of each of these codes are
similar with regards to egress, only the requirements of the LSC will be discussed herein.

Required Number of Exits
The building, due to its varying occupancy types was evaluated in terms of egress
capacity both for specific sections as well as overall. The maximum occupancy load was
calculated as 1,061. Section 7.4.1.2 of the Life Safety Code (2009 edition) requires a
building with an occupancy load of more than 1,000 to have 4 exits. This building,
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because of its somewhat complex layout has 7 exit discharge doors. With regards to
number of exits alone, the building design adequately complies with this mandate of the
LSC. The layout of exits and travel paths to those exits are presented in Figures 86
through 92 in Appendix B.

Exit Access Apart from Passing Through Intervening Rooms
Section 7.5.1.2 of the LSC states, “Corridors shall provide exit access without
passing through intervening rooms other than corridors, lobbies, and other spaces
permitted to be open to the corridor unless otherwise provided in 7.5.1.2.1 and 7.5.1.2.2.”
The first of these two exceptions allow for existing buildings to continue using passage
through a room to access an exit if approved by the AHJ, if the travel path is marked,
doors along the path are in compliance with other exit requirements and there is no other
prohibition.
In the Center for the Arts, some of the exit paths pass through other rooms. Even
so, it appears that such a layout is generally in compliance with the provisions set forth in
Section 7.5.1.2.1 of the LSC. The building layout also complies with Section 7.5.1.6,
which allows for continued use of existing passages to pass through other rooms if
approved by the AHJ.
Access to the first floor exit from the front lobby and half of the main theater is
adequate if people use both the main entry door and the art gallery exit door. The
occupant load of 378 (for half of the main theater and all of the front lobby) is excessive
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for the 360-person capacity served by just the 72-inch wide main lobby door. This extra
load is adequately handled however if some of the people divert into and through the art
gallery and used the exit discharge door there. The location of the art gallery door does
not strictly meet the LSC provisions with regard to remoteness of exits since the art
gallery exit and main exit are not adequately separated as required by Section 7.5.1.3.2 of
the LSC. That provision requires they be located at a distance from one another of not
less than one-half the diagonal dimension of the area to be served.

To meet this

requirement, the two doors would have to be about 60 feet apart. They are in fact about
12 feet from each other.
The second floor has two exits doors. The first is the normal entrance and exit
located at street level at the southeast corner of the building that is used by most people.
A second exit, an emergency exit located at the north wall of the second floor does not
lead directly out of the building but instead passes into and through the main theater.
Stairs for this exit lead down to the south edge of the platform/stage. There, evacuees can
choose to go directly to the theater’s north exit door that discharges into the rear parking
area or use one of two paths to go the main exit door to the south. The second floor rear
exit stairs terminate adjacent to a door to the front dressing room. That dressing room in
turn opens into the front lobby. Evacuees could also leave the platform/stage and use the
south exit from the theater into the front lobby and out the front of the building that way.
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Remoteness of Exits
The remoteness requirements for exits set forth in Sections 7.5.1.3.1 and 7.5.1.3.2
of the LSC are satisfied in only part of the Center for the Arts building. The main theater
has exits in the north and south walls. Those doors are sufficiently distant from each
other. The north exit discharges to a parking lot at the north exterior of the building. The
south exit leads into the front lobby. That lobby has a single main exit discharge in the
south wall that empties onto a public street.

Section 7.5.1.6 of the LSC states, “Exit

access from rooms or spaces shall be permitted to be through adjoining or intervening
rooms or areas, provided that such rooms or areas are accessory to the area served.
Foyers, lobbies, and reception rooms constructed as required for corridors shall not be
construed as intervening rooms.” Accordingly, the south door of the theater is permitted
to empty into the front lobby.
As mentioned earlier, the exit doors in the front lobby do not meet the remoteness
requirement. There are two ways out of this room besides the main entry. One requires
going into and through the adjoining art gallery to an exit that discharges onto a public
street. The interior door to the art gallery is only about five feet away from the main exit.
The second path out of the main lobby other than through the main exit would be going
north through the door into the main theater. If the people evacuating the building
originated in the theater, then clearly the theater door would be an entrance into the front
lobby and not an exit out of it.
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Figure 15: The main exit from the front lobby (shown centered) is only steps away from
the entry to the art gallery (show behind the easel) that leads to another exit.
The door between the front lobby and the theater would qualify as a final exit
from either room if the separating wall between them met the requirements for a
horizontal exit. Currently it does not.
Section 3.3.75.1 of the LSC defines a horizontal exit as, “A way of passage from
one building to an area of refuge in another building on approximately the same level, or
a way of passage through or around a fire barrier to an area of refuge on approximately
the same level in the same building that affords safety from fire and smoke originating
from the area of incidence and areas communicating therewith.” The wall separating the
main theater from the front lobby (and from the second floor) does not meet the fire
resistance requirements of a fire barrier. First, the 72-inch wide door between the theater
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and the front lobby is not a fire-rated door.

Also, there are several non-sealed

penetrations at various levels including several HVAC ducting runs.

Figure 16: The door between the front lobby and the main theater. The non fire-rated
door plus wall penetrations prevent use of this passage as a horizontal exit.
Exit remoteness requirements are likely not met in the rear theater either. While
the distance between two openings that could be used as exits is sufficient, most theater
occupants will likely only be aware of one of them. The main 72-inch wide exit in the
west wall opens from the theater into a parking lot and is clearly visible. A 36-inch
doorway located 30 feet north behind the stage is not readily apparent from audience
seating. That doorway leads from behind the platform/stage and into and through the
sprinkler control room, which in turn opens to the exterior. Because stage sets are

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

25

usually positioned between that doorway and the audience blocking its view, most people
would be unaware it exists.

Section 7.5.1.1 of the LSC requires that, “Exits shall be

located and exit access shall be arranged so that exits are readily accessible at all times.”
While these two exits are separated by more than half of the 55 foot diagonal
measurement of the rear theater, until both doors are clearly visible at all times, the exit
arrangement in the room is deficient.

Figure 17: A 36-inch doorway leading to an exit in the sprinkler control room is located
behind the platform/stage and is neither clearly marked nor readily accessible.
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Figure 18: 16 feet beyond the main exit (at the right) is an exit hallway to the rear lobby.
Each requires travel past the edge of the seating through a 52-inch wide walkway.
A third exit also leads out of the rear theater. A 36-inch hallway behind the
seating and south of the theater’s main exit connects to the rear lobby. The entrance to
the hallway is about 16 feet away from the theater’s primary exit.

If the main exit is

blocked by fire or an obstruction, reaching the hallway would be very difficult. The
second exit behind the stage that leads into and through the sprinkler control room would
be the only alternative egress path.
On the second floor, remoteness requirements are met both in individual rooms as
well as for the two exits from the floor. The main exit leads down stairs and discharges
on a public street. A second, emergency exit passes through a fire door in the north wall
and to an open staircase that leads down to the south edge of the main platform/stage.
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Further exit from there is either through a door into the front dressing room and then onto
the front lobby or into the main theater and through one of its two theater exits. Although
these interior stairs to the main theater allow an alternate path out of the second floor,
because of their location high in the main theater, they would be almost immediately
subject to smoke conditions and unusable if a fire was burning in the theater.
If the wall between the main theater and the second floor was a qualifying firewall
as defined in Section 3.3.75.1 of the LSC for a horizontal exit, the rear stairs might be an
adequate exit. Currently however, that is not the situation. In order for the stairs to
comply with the prescriptive requirements of the LSC, they would have to either enter a
smoke proof enclosure inside the theater or a separating wall would have to be
constructed to qualify that door as a horizontal exit. The rear exit door from the second
floor currently is a fire rated door.

Dead Ends
Provisions related to dead-end travel are set forth in Table A.7.6 of the LSC. For
both new and existing assembly occupancies, regardless of whether or not they are
sprinklered, the limit for dead end travel is 20 feet. The only dead ends in the front lobby
could be entered either by moving into the hall leading towards the bathrooms or entering
the business office from the main entrance lobby foyer. The bathroom path extends less
than 20 feet from the main lobby and does not violate the dead end provision. Someone
walking into and through the office however could travel more than 20 feet before
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reaching a dead end, forcing them to turn around. This path is technically in violation of
the 20-foot long dead end limit. Since the main exit is a glass double door in a glass wall
however, it seems unlikely anyone leaving the building would instead bypass the exit
door by making a sharp left turn and entering the office rather than just continuing
straight ahead through the main exit door only 4 feet away.

Figure 19: Dead end hallway from front lobby leading to restrooms.
In the main theater, a dead end path lies alongside the south side of the fixed
seating, but as with the office scenario, the possibility of people traveling that path seems
remote. To enter that dead end, one would have to walk past the adjacent exit door. It
seems unlikely anyone would pass immediately next to the exit door without noticing it.
Since the theater ceiling height is 27 feet high at the peak and since it is sprinklered,
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smoke levels would likely remain above the door for a long enough period after the onset
of a fire so the first people moving to the exit would not bypass the door without seeing
it. If they did however, the distance they might travel before having to turn around would
be approximately 20 feet. During each of the assessment visits to the Center for the Arts,
the rear portion of that pathway was blocked by chair storage usually making the dead
end distance less than 20 feet.
Another possible dead end path in the theater would involve travel towards the
bar at the north of the fixed seating area. Like the previous mentioned path at the south
end of the fixed seating, turning towards the bar seems an unlikely choice. Normal exit
flow to the north would have to be interrupted by a sharp turn to the east. Should that
happen, the distance to the east wall dead end would be approximately 36 feet.
On the second floor, the only potential dead end would be leaving Dance Studio 3
towards the exit stairs to the exterior and entering a short walkway leading to the storage
room. The walkway is adjacent to the exit stairs. Both paths initially lead to the east.
The dead end distance involved is less than 10 feet.

Travel Distance Limit
Travel distance limits are prescribed in Table A.7.6 of the LSC. The travel
distance limit of 250 feet for sprinklered buildings is easily met throughout the Center for
the Arts. The entire structure is approximately 262 feet long and there is no means by
which one could travel completely inside the building over that entire distance.
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On the second floor, exceeding the travel distance limits is not an issue. Egress
through the main exit to the exterior of the building involves a maximum distance of
about 100 feet. If one exited through the rear of the second floor into the main theater
below, then once on the ground floor, the travel distance to either the rear or front exits
would be approximately 100 feet. Even considering the longest possible second floor
path in addition to the remaining distance on the ground floor, the overall travel path
remains well below the allowable 250 feet.

Discharge from Exits
All paths to exits on the first floor lead directly to exit discharges from the
building. From the second floor, the emergency exit first leads into the main theater
where paths to first floor exit discharges are located. Neither of the second floor exits
require a change in direction to head in an upward direction once downward travel
commences.
The three exits at the front of the building, in the art gallery, the main lobby and
the second floor stairs each discharge directly to a public sidewalk. That sidewalk allows
movement away from the building in either direction. At the rear, exits open at a large
parking lot owned by the Center for the Arts, which in turn connects to a public street and
sidewalk and allows for movement away from the building.
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Illumination of Means of Egress
During musical and stage productions, both theaters are typically darkened with
only dim theater lighting showing. All of the exits out of the main theater are lit with
standard, interior backlit green illumination signs marked "EXIT". The main exit from
the rear theater is also clearly marked in the same manner. Other exits including those in
the main and rear lobbies, the art gallery, and those from the second floor are similarly
marked.

Each “EXIT” sign has battery backup systems that are tested regularly.

Packaged with the signs are dual floodlights that also have emergency battery power.
These signs are mounted directly above each exit, no more than a foot above the top of
the 80-inch high doors in accordance with Section 7.10.1.9 of the LSC. The doorway
behind the rear stage leading into the sprinkler control room is the only exit not marked
with an “EXIT” sign.
The main theater fixed seating has rows of flexible tube lights with LED lighting
that mark the exit pathways out of the seating area and onto the main floor which then
leads to exits marked with lighted signs. Similarly, the railing along the stairs from the
second floor into the theater is also marked with LED lighting.

Interior Finishes
The requirements for interior finish of buildings are found in section 10.2 of the
LSC. In addition to describing the various testing methods allowed for testing finishes,
multiple finish classifications are also listed.
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Interior finish requirements set forth in A.10.2.2 of the LSC call for all exits in an
assembly occupancy to meet interior finish Class A materials. Exit access corridors and
most other spaces must meet Class A or B. The Center for the Arts is sprinklered
throughout. Accordingly in any area where Class B finish materials are called for, Class
C materials suffice. Likewise, because of the sprinklers, where Class A materials are
called out, Class B materials will suffice in their place. Section 13.3.3.3 of the LSC
requires that in existing buildings with general assembly areas having occupant loads of
more than 300, interior wall and ceiling finish materials shall also be rated Class A or
Class B. These classifications are obtained through testing using either the ASTM E84
“Steiner Tunnel” test or ANSI/UL 723 test.
The interior ceiling finish throughout the main and rear theaters in the Center for
the Arts and much of the second floor dance studios poses a serious concern in this
regard. Ceilings in these areas are lined with exposed insulation affixed to the underside
of the roof. The facing of the insulation on the exposed side is a paper-like material. In
each of the theaters, this facing has been painted black to reduce light reflection.
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Figure 20: Exposed, painted, paper-like insulation facing on the underside of the entire
main theater ceiling
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Figure 21: Close up view of exposed, paper-like insulation facing under the main theater
ceiling. Here it is shown cut where penetrated by sprinkler piping.

Figure 22: Similar exposed, insulation facing on the underside of rear theater ceiling
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Figure 23: Exposed, insulation facing on the underside of the ceiling on the second floor.
It is unknown if white is the material’s original color or if it also has been painted.
Center for the Arts personnel were unaware whether the exposed ceiling finish
throughout the building had been tested for flame spread and smoke generation in
accordance with the ASTM E-84 or ANSI/UL 723 tests or if it was ever assigned an
interior finish classification. A simple, open flame test of the insulation facing was
conducted by Center for the Arts personnel. A small section of the painted, paper-like
facing was exposed to an open flame of a cigarette lighter. The material readily ignited.
While such a test is insufficient to assign a flame spread rating, it clearly shows the need
to have the material properly tested at the soonest opportunity. If it does not achieve at
least a Class B rating as required by 13.3.3.3, prompt, remedial measures should be taken
to either treat, remove or cover the exposed insulation facing.
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Another potential fire safety issue with interior finish is the flammability of the
vertical hanging curtains/sound dampening cloth panels located at each side and the rear
of the main platform/stage. Section 10.3.1 of the LSC states, “Where required by the
applicable provisions of this Code, draperies, curtains, and other similar loosely hanging
furnishings and decorations shall meet the flame propagation performance criteria
contained in NFPA 701, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of
Textiles and Films.”

Section 13.7.4.1 of the LSC governing existing assembly

occupancies states, “Fabrics and films used for decorative purposes, all draperies and
curtains, and similar furnishings shall be in accordance with the provisions of 10.3.1.”
Section 806.1 of the CBC states that in assembly occupancies, “…curtains, draperies,
hangings and other decorative materials suspended from walls or ceilings shall meet the
flame propagation performance criteria of NFPA 701 … or be noncombustible.” These
sections clearly require that the curtains in the Center for the Arts’ theater must be or
have been tested and meet related flame propagation standards.
The NFPA 701 tests involve applying a burner flame to a vertically positioned
sample of a material (such as the curtains) for a specified time. Upon removal of the
flame, the sample must self-extinguish and must not have charred beyond a specified
distance in order to pass the test.
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Figure 24: Main theater curtains immediately adjacent to the second floor exit stairs
Though there are anecdotal reports that the Center for the Arts’ curtains may have
been treated with fire retardant materials, no known documentation was found showing
evidence they had undergone NFPA 701 flame propagation testing. Curtains that do not
pass such a test could, if ignited, pose a danger not only to the actors/stagehands on or
near the platform/stage but also to the audience throughout the main theater. Non-fireresistant curtains would also present an extreme threat to occupants of the second floor
who might be forced to use the rear, emergency exit stairs. Those stairs discharge to the
south edge of the stage immediately adjacent to the curtain panels.
The Center for the Arts’ exterior walls are painted, concrete block. Flooring
generally consists of hardwood panels mounted over a concrete underlayment. Interior
walls are typically gypsum board attached to wooden studs. The front lobby and business
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spaces have a “T-bar”, metal, ceiling grid support system into which standard mineral
tiles are laid. Above the 9-foot high drop ceilings are approximately 3 foot ceiling void
spaces through which standard HVAC systems and other support systems such as
electrical power is routed.

Types of Occupants
Since the Center for the Arts now serves primarily as a public venue for various
types of live entertainment, it is likely that many occupants will be visitors not intimately
familiar with the layout of the building or its egress systems. Alcohol is not regularly
served in the building but occasionally some alcohol is available at one of two portable
bars. Such alcohol service is not the primary focus of the businesses but is merely an
ancillary activity. Rarely is inebriation by guests a concern.
The occupants of the upper floor are also generally transient in nature with the
typical visitors there attending the dance studio and instruction facility. It is possible that
many of those people are repeat visitors who are more likely to be familiar with the
regular exit that is also the principal entrance, than would be visitors to the ground floor
theaters.
The second floor facilities are typically operated during standard business hours
and the majority of the visitors are juveniles or young adults. Some mature adults also
visit the facility either as tenants, instructors or for other business interests. The ground
floor theaters are used both for with matinee presentations as well as more typical
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evening performances. The main theater also serves as a training facility for actors and
entertainers during non-event hours.
If a fire were to occur on the second floor, that area in the building will likely be
staffed with regular employees who are familiar with the egress systems and exit
passages. It is not known whether these employees participate in regular fire or other
emergency drills or if they regularly instruct their students or customers about the same
information.
Pre-movement activities for the second floor are expected to be similar to those
experienced with most business occupancies. If regular fire drills are not conducted it is
likely that the persons inside could spend the first few minutes attempting to verify the
validity of an fire if they do not receive outside confirming signals such as the odor of
smoke to indicate a fire.
Dance students on the second floor might be dressed in atypical pubic attire such
as leotards or other dance garb. With many of these participants being young females, it
could be expected that prior to exiting the building, they might try to gather clothing and
personal belongings from the second floor dressing room. Also, there may be music
playing to accompany their dance or exercise routines. Such music might interfere with
prompt recognition of alarm notification signals.
Accordingly, for the second floor, the pre-movement time before occupants
actually departing through the two exit doors is estimated at up to three to fire minutes.
The second floor is only about 75 foot square so once occupants decide to move, travel
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times to an exit will be relatively short. Once egress begins, there is only one floor to
descend through with a vertical height of approximately 12 feet.
In the main theater, lighting is typically dimmed during performances. One
danger in any performing arts venue is that the event of a fire, the audience might not
immediately recognize an alarm or fire as a real event and not merely part of the show.
Dimmed lighting and potentially loud music from performances are expected to add to
the recognition time of a fire event. This was one of the problems encountered at the
Station Nightclub fire in 2003 in Rhode Island where people did not recognize that the
initial fire posed a real threat and was not just part of the show.

As a result, extended

pre-movement times and flammable interior finish contributed to the deaths of 100
people and injuries to about 230 more.
It is anticipated that people inside the main theater will start moving towards an
exit within two minutes of hearing or seeing the results of an alarm activation or fire.
Pre-movement times for main theater guests may be shorter than for second floor dance
studio visitors since theater guests will not typically have many belongings to be
concerned about. Further, the onset of several people starting to leave the theater should
serve as a signal to others that they should also evacuate.
The front lobby south of the main theater can serve as gathering/meeting place for
local events. Visitors there may not readily appreciate a fire event in the main theater.
Double doors separate the front lobby and theater. Door windows are covered with
privacy fabric to keep light out of the theater.
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It is anticipated that should a fire occur in the main theater or in an adjoining
space, the occupants in the front lobby may have extended pre-movement times since it
may take considerably longer for them to recognize that a fire is burning. That along
with a set of glass doors in clear view less than 50 feet away may make these persons feel
more secure in their ability to exit. Two to three minutes of pre-movement time is
anticipated for these people. The front occupants’ first indication of a fire elsewhere in
the building might be seeing people from inside the main theater evacuating through the
doors that open to the front lobby on their way to the main exit.
The total floor space in the smaller, rear theater is slightly less than 1,000 square
feet. Between the actors, the stagehands and the approximately 60 guests expected
during a performance, it is not anticipated that a fire in that space would go unnoticed for
long. Distances to adjacent exits are no greater than 40 feet so once people start moving
towards an exit the movement should be quickly noticed. Pre-movement time in the rear
theater would likely be on the order of one minute or less.

RSET Estimations
Required Safe Egress Time or RSET, the estimated time needed to evacuate a
building is dependent upon several variables. These variables include the time to detect
and notify occupants of a fire, the time taken by occupants to recognize the need to
evacuate and then start moving, and then the travel time of the actual evacuation.
According to Nelson and Mowrer’s chapter on “Emergency Movement” in the 3rd edition
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of the Society of Fire Protection Engineering Handbook, “RSET can be subdivided into a
number of discrete time intervals, the sum of which constitute the total RSET…” An
equation proposed to demonstrate this principle is:

RSET = td + ta + to + ti + te
where:

td = time from ignition to detection
ta = time from detection to notification of occupants
to = time from notification until occupants decide to take action
ti = time from decision to take action until evacuation commences
te = time from the start to the completion of evacuation
These time relationships and their relationship to one another are depicted in the

following diagram.
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Figure 25: Graphical relationship between ASET and RSET
Often in such analyses, detection and notification time (shown above as td) is
based upon detection by smoke and/or heat detectors which in turn activate notification
devices such as horns or strobes. Because of the lack of these devices in the Center for
the Arts, such a time equivalency does not exist throughout most of the building. As a
result, determination of detection and notification time in determining RSET is based
upon an evaluator’s best judgment.
At present, there are no smoke detectors installed in the main theater area nor are
there any notification devices. Previously, the AHJ decided that the presence of sprinklers
were adequate for notification. If a fire started and hot gases rose to the arched roof and
activated sprinklers, then visitors may be “notified” in the manner of a notification
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device.

The problem with such a scenario is that with a flammable ceiling finish

throughout the theater, by the time a sprinkler activated, fire growth could be extremely
fast and untenable conditions could be quickly reached.
If a fire was to occur on the platform/stage out of sight of main theater visitors but
not trigger sprinklers to activate, the first indication of a fire by guests might be an
interruption of a production and unexpected, yet hurried evacuation of the stage area.
The confusion by visitors that would be expected to accompany such an interruption
could cause a significant delay in deciphering whether the actions are part of the show.
That confusion may extend the detection time far beyond what would be expected if
detection and notification devices were in place and functioning.
It is anticipated that pre-movement times for occupants in most spaces of the
Center for the Arts, particularly during productions, will be noticeably longer than
perhaps they would be for the same people in most business or mercantile facilities.
These delays will in large part depend upon how long it takes for the first occupants to
detect something that is extremely unusual by their seeing flames, smelling smoke, being
directed by others who have already detected the fire or by seeing an unexpected and
hurried movement of people towards exits.
Uncertainty in the analysis of movement time is based in part on occupant
characteristics and their conditions at the time of evacuation. The ages of visitors to the
Center for the Arts ranges from the very young to the elderly, some perhaps in
wheelchairs or with limited mobility. A majority of the people in the facility during
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productions could be first time visitors. Even those who might be more familiar with the
facility due to having attended numerous productions may still be completely unfamiliar
with any egress path besides their typical route in and out of the building.
According to Center for the Arts staff, while alcohol is occasionally served, it
rarely results in inebriation.

Even so, considering the likely lack of familiarization by

visitors with the building, the variations in their physical condition, and the prospect of
their being in darkened and loud conditions during productions and thus not having their
normal levels of sight and hearing, the movement times estimated herein should be
considered as minimums for fires occurring during productions. At other times such as
during visits to the facility outside productions, occupancy levels would be expected to be
far lower than at the maximum and fewer people would be available to signal the need to
evacuate.
In light of these factors, it is imperative that the Center for the Arts staff and
performers are trained in and willing participants for notifying visitors of possible fires
and assisting them in evacuations.

The leadership role of staff members can, if

enthusiastically embraced, reduce pre-movement time and as a result, overall evacuation
time.
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Estimated Movement Times
Calculations of estimated movement times are detailed in Appendix A. The
general factors regarding each space that are used in those calculations are discussed
below.

Art Gallery
The art gallery is located at the front of the building and fronts a public street. It
measures slightly less than 1,000 square feet in area and is used for various meetings and
art displays independent of productions in either of the theaters.

The maximum

occupancy of the gallery was determined to be 132 persons based on a concentrated
usage calculation in which space allotted per person is less than half of “less
concentrated” use (see Appendix A). Under “less concentrated” use conditions such as
when tables are used in the room and seating is provided, the occupancy load would be
62 persons. The gallery has one, 72-inch exit door that discharges onto the street. It also
has another 72-inch door that leads to the front lobby about 5 feet from the building’s
main exit. Assuming everyone is equally spaced through the art gallery and heads to the
exit at about the same time, it is estimated that evacuating the maximum 132 people from
the art gallery will take about 66 seconds.
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Front Lobby and Adjacent Rooms (less main theater population)
The front lobby and adjacent rooms encompass the first floor of the structure
south of the main theater apart from the art gallery. The area includes offices, the main
lobby, restrooms, and a dressing room for performers. It will be referred to collectively
as the front lobby. Its maximum occupancy load is 199 people (see Appendix A). The
front lobby discharges to the exterior of the building through a 72-inch wide glass door.
Another 72-inch wide door within feet of the main exit door leads into the art gallery and
accesses its 72-inch wide glass door that also discharges to the exterior of the building.
Assuming the people are equally spaced throughout the front lobby and adjacent
rooms, the longest travel distance to the discharge door exit is about 80 feet. It is
assumed that there will be minimal queuing at the front exit door when only occupants in
these spaces are considered. Movement times for the evacuation of the front lobby are
estimated to be on the order of 119 seconds.

Main Theater, Platform/Stage, and Adjoining Supply Rooms
The main theater and its ancillary spaces are located just north of the front lobby
and measure approximately 5,400 square feet. The maximum occupant load for this area
was calculated at 358 people (see Appendix A). This value is higher than the occupancy
loads experienced during non-production times. The main theater area has fixed seating
that includes 170 loge-type seats on a progressively elevated, enclosed wooden
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framework and up to 50 moveable seats that can be placed on the main floor in front of
the elevated seating. A lounge area adjacent and north of the fixed seating section is
available for visitors to get drinks and light food items prior to the start of a production.
The occupant load of the lounge area and bar was calculated to be 48 people. During
actual production events, people do not congregate in the lounge area but must be seated.
Even so, the occupancy load of 48 was included in the maximum capacity analyzed in
this evaluation. Lastly, the platform stage area and ancillary storage rooms have a
maximum occupancy of 90 people. In total, the maximum occupancy load in the main
theater is estimated at 358 people.
It is assumed that in the case of a fire, the people in the theater will divide in nearequal groups and head to one of the two, 72-inch wide exit doors for the theater. The rear
exit discharge door in the north wall of the theater leads to a parking lot at the rear of the
building. The front door leads into the front lobby and then to the front exit discharge
door.
The raised, seating platform consists of seven rows of fixed seats with springloaded seat bottoms that lift when an occupant stands. After the seats rise, there is an
approximately 18-inch wide path between rows of seats for people to walk through.
There are two aisles of stairs for people to enter and leave the seating platform, one on
each side. The average distance for a person to walk from their seat to the closest aisle is
about 12 feet.

The steps on these exit aisles each have treads of about 40 inches and

risers of about 7 inches. They lead to sets of three steps at the bottom of each exit aisle
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that in turn descend 21 inches to the main floor. For the last person to reach the ground
floor by first traversing their seating row and then down the exit aisle and steps involves
about 40 feet of horizontal travel plus the equivalent of about 6 feet of vertical descent
from the top row.
Estimations were made of the movement times for evacuations using one or both
exits. The movement times ranged between 2.6 minutes when both doors were available
to 3.3 minutes when only one door could be used. Specific calculations are presented in
Appendix A.

Rear Theater, Platform/Stage and Actor Areas
The rear theater, platform/stage area and actor spaces have a maximum occupant
load of 110 people. The rear theater floor measures about 1,500 square feet. Of that,
approximately 400 square feet is seating and the remainder includes the stage, the area
between the audience and the stage, and the control room and actor areas. It is estimated
that because of the room’s size, the time to alert the people in this area of a fire will be
minimal and that pre-movement times will be negligible.
A 72-inch wide door serves the rear theater. Most of the occupants (less actors in
their spaces or people in the control room will have to pass this door when entering the
theater through the 36-inch wide hallway from the rear lobby. It is assumed that most
people will exit through the main door inside the rear theater rather than bypassing it in
favor or the hallway (13 feet away) to return to the lobby to exit.
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Of the maximum 110 people in the rear theater, about 60 people are expected to
be seated on a tiered, seating platform, the highest point of which is 2 feet above the
floor. Chairs there are portable and arranged together but unconnected nor affixed to the
platform. According to the Section 1028.12 of the California Fire Code, “In places of
assembly, the seats shall be securely fastened to the floor.” Exception 4 to that
provision states, “In places of assembly where flexibility of the seating arrangement
is an integral part of the design and function of the space and seating is on tiered
levels, a maximum of 200 seats shall not be required to be fastened to the floor.
Plans showing seating, tiers and aisles shall be submitted for approval.” Despite the
possibility of the seats being tipped over leading to potential obstructions during an
evacuation, this exception to the CFC allows for the seating in the rear theater to
remain loosely positioned as long as the arrangement of those seats conforms to the
plans submitted to the AHJ.
The furthest distance from the main door in the rear theater is about 40 feet of
horizontal travel.

That plus the travel distance on the seating platform makes the

maximum distance anyone would have to travel on the order of 50 feet or less.
To reach the main exit door, occupants will have to pass through a narrowed
walkway between the seating platform and the west wall. That walkway is about 52
inches wide. The south entrance to that walkway from the seating area and stage could
become a chokepoint where queuing might be expected. Considering delays that might
be experienced at that chokepoint if queuing occurred, it would take approximately 1.5
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minutes for all 110 people to pass the chokepoint and leave through the main exit door
once movement begins.
A second option for people to evacuate from the rear theater would be for some to
pass through the unmarked doorway behind the platform/stage and on through the
sprinkler control room exit to the exterior. The interior doorway is unmarked however
and generally blocked from view and egress by the stage sets. Accordingly, the only
people likely familiar with that route would be actors and those who regularly work in the
theater. If 10 people were familiar with and used that route, it would only reduce the
overall time to evacuate the theater by about 7 seconds to a total time of about 1 minute
and 23 seconds.

Rear Lobby, Dressing Rooms and Restrooms
The rear lobby, dressing rooms and restrooms have a maximum occupant load of
48 people. The occupant load for the adjacent rear supply rooms is 3 people.

The

supply rooms are fitted with a 72-inch wide exit door and a 96-inch wide garage type
roll-up door.

Egress should not pose a problem from them and they will not be

considered further.
The rear lobby has a 72-inch wide door that opens onto the parking lot. The door
could accommodate a pass-through rate of 120 people per minute. Considering the
maximum expected number of occupants, no queuing is expected. If egress through the
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door was somehow blocked, occupants could also travel through a hallway or the
dressing rooms into the rear theater and exit through the 72 inch door there.
If the lobby door is not blocked and all occupants exit through it, the time to
evacuate will be approximately 24 seconds which includes the time to walk the maximum
distance of about 50 feet to the exit.

Second Floor
The second floor occupancies are situated over the combination of the first floor
lobby, adjacent rooms and the art gallery. They include a dance studio (with three dance
rooms), a dressing room, offices and reception area, a sound studio, associated hallways,
restrooms and a storage room. The total second floor space measures approximately 5000
square feet.
According to calculations shown in Appendix A, the maximum occupancy load of
the second floor is 211 people. The second floor is fitted with two stair exits. One of the
stairs serves as the main and typical entrance / exit to the second floor. It is entered from
and discharges directly to a sidewalk at the front exterior of the building. A second stair
designed to serve only as an emergency exit is located at the rear (north side) of the
second floor at the reception area. It provides egress from the second floor down to the
first floor inside the main theater adjacent to the main platform/stage. Once there, two
exit paths can be chosen. One leads through a 36-inch door to the front dressing room
and onto the front lobby and the other to a 36-inch doorway to the floor of the main
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theater. The rear emergency exit door does not serve as a normal entrance to the second
floor.
Travel over the front stairs includes a 12-foot vertical distance between the floors
and approximately 20 feet of landings or level path between the door at the top of the
stairs and the front, exit discharge door. The travel over the rear stairs also includes a 12foot vertical distance between the floors and approximately 22 feet of landing or level
path.
Since all of the people normally entering the second floor do so through the front
stairs it is assumed most occupants will try to exit along the same path using the front
stairs. Since the door to the rear stairs is located in the second floor reception area, some
people who are there when a fire is detected might choose to evacuate via the rear stairs.
Movement times to exit the second floor were estimated for four different
scenarios: 100% of occupants using the front stairs, 100% using the rear stairs, 50%
using each of the stairs and 75% using the front and 25% using the rear. It is assumed
that as long as neither exit is blocked by obstructions or fire, 75% of the second floor
occupants (158 people) will use the front stairs and 25% (53 people) will attempt to use
the rear stairs. Each of the scenarios results in slight queuing at the entrance doors to the
stairs. If an evacuation of the first floor is already underway, any additional queuing of
the second floor occupants once they reach the first floor would be dependent on things
such as pre-movement times of the first floor occupants.
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In general, movement times for the maximum number of people on the second
floor (211) varies from 2.9 minutes if half the occupants use each set of stairs to 5.3
minutes if everyone is forced to use the rear stairs. If a fire in the main theater makes the
rear stairs inaccessible, it would take 5.1 minutes of movement time to evacuate everyone
through the front stairs.
Table	
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Estimated Movement Times
Area of
Building

Maximum
Occupancy

Art Gallery
Front Lobby &
Adjoining Rooms
Main Theater

132

Special
Conditions

Minutes

Seconds

1.1

66

2.6-2.75

156-165

3.3

200

1.5

90

0.4

24

2.9

174

4.0

239

5.1

304

5.3

318

199
358
358

Rear Theater
110

Both exits
available
One exit
available
Main exit
available

Rear Lobby &
Dressing Rooms
48
Second Floor
211
211

211
211

50% through
each exit
75% through
front exit,
25% through
rear
100% through
front exit
100% through
rear exit

Table 3: Estimated Movement Times

The calculations upon which these values are based are presented in Appendix A.
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Water-based Suppression
Installed Automatic Sprinkler System
An automatic sprinkler system was installed in the building in 1993 when the
building occupancy changed to include a gymnasium in what is now the main theater.
The occupancy changed again around 2002 when it was converted to its current use as a
performing arts center. At that time, the sprinkler system was not modified.
The sprinkler system installed into the building is a wet-pipe system designed to
control a fire rather than extinguish it.

Considering the assembly occupancy spaces in

the building, system activation is designed to allow extra egress time for their safe
evacuation.
When the sprinkler system was first installed, the building served primarily as a
gymnasium and health-club type facility and the sprinkler system was classified
according to an “Ordinary Hazard, Group 1”. If a new system were designed today, the
dance school would likely maintain the OH-1 classification originally assigned when the
system was installed or perhaps fall under a Light Hazard classification.

The

auditorium/theater areas apart from the platform stage would also be classified at Light
Hazard but the platform/stage in the theater would be classified as Ordinary Hazard,
Group 2.
The density/area criterion for which the sprinkler system was designed was 0.15
gpm/ft2 over a 1,500-ft2 area of sprinkler operation. For the areas such as the theater and
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offices that could currently be classified Light Hazard by NFPA 13, the installed
density/area criteria exceed what is needed since they require only was 0.10 gpm/ft2 over
a 1,500 ft2 area. For an actual stage, the hazard classification would be Ordinary Hazard,
Group 2. The required density/area coverage for OH-2 of 0.20 gpm/ft2 over an area of
1,500 ft2 would be slightly more than the existing coverage. The Center for the Arts
production area is not officially a stage but rather a platform because the lack of hanging
curtains over the front as well as hanging sets and props.

It is uncertain whether the

technical differences between a stage and a platform might allow for a less dense
coverage than OH-2. In any case, the AHJ did not require an increase in the density after
the conversion to a performing arts center.

Water Supply
The water supply for the building is supplied via city water mains of the local
city. It is located at the rear of the building in underground mains that run along the
street, immediately north of and perpendicular to the long axis of the building. The water
is fed by a gravity feed from a water treatment facility located about one mile away at a
higher elevation of several hundred feet.
According to records of recent tests conducted by the city’s Public Works
Department, the water supply for the Center for the Performing Arts’ sprinkler system
has a static pressure of 64 psi and a residual pressure of 54 psi at a flow rate of 2,400
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gpm. The connection to the building’s sprinkler system is underground at the far north
end of the facility.

System Location and Layout
The sprinkler system riser enters the northernmost utility room of the building
adjacent to a public street. The riser is made of 4 inch, Schedule 10 steel pipe. At the
sprinkler room, the riser is fitted with two inline gate valves, a check valve, test line
apparatus and a pressure gauge. The fire department’s 4-inch connection is located above
the check valve and tees into the riser. That FD connection is fitted with a check valve
(prior to the “T”) and extends to the exterior of the building to a single male fitting.
The riser climbs for an elevation of 18 feet where it ties via an elbow into a 3inch, Schedule 10 steel feed main that leads south into the building. At the north end of
the building in the single-story section which houses a “day theater”, dressing rooms,
waiting room and storage areas, branch lines are fed off the primary north-south supply.
The feed main line tees off to a 3 inch cross main running east and west along the short
axis of the building and which in turn supplies three branch lines that T and run to the
north and to the south covering the length of the northern, one-story annex. Branch lines
are a combination of 1-1/4” and 2 inch Schedule 40 piping.
Each of the cross main sections and branch line pipes is supported by a
combination of adjustable swivel ring hangers and rigid pipe supports attached to the
building’s structural roof members.
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The principle feed main travels for 152 feet to the south and enters the main
portion of the building where it T’s into another 3-inch cross-main. The secondary cross
main spreads out across the full width of the building. Rising off that cross main are
various 2 inch riser nipples, each rising to feed one of seven north-south running branch
lines spaced 10 to 12 feet apart that are fitted with sprinkler heads for the main theater.
These lines continue 76 feet to the south where they T into a downward leading pipe as
well as extend further south at the same elevation into the second floor ceiling area (at the
front of the building). The downward-flowing vertical pipes extend to just above the
height of the first floor ceiling and then T again into horizontal pipes that supply the first
floor at the front of the building.

Figure 26: Plan view of the sprinkler layout. The remote area shown here is located on
the second floor in Dance Studio 1. North is to the left.
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The sprinklers that are used for the system are a combination of ½ inch upright,
brass pendants (k-factor = 5.6) or recessed, ½ inch pendants. Most of the sprinklers are
165 °F activated, standard response sprinklers that are the “A” model, manufactured by
Central sprinklers. The sprinklers are not glass bulb activated sprinklers but instead have
a fusible alloy sealed into the sprinkler’s brass activating rod that is held in place by a
stainless steel ball.
The most remote area of the sprinkler system was determined to be sprinklers on
branch lines on the second floor at the south end of the building. Second floor sprinklers
were spaced 12 feet, 10.5 feet, or 10 feet apart (the system was initially approved with a
non-symmetrical spacing to best fit room layouts) on the branch lines. It was determined
that 12 heads would have to operate to cover the required 1,500 ft2 area of operation. In
order to determine the size requirement for the length of one size of the remote area, the
formula, L ≥ 1.2 √1500, was used. That gave a minimum length of 46.5 feet along a
branch line. Further, the sprinkler system designer calculated the area of coverage by a
particular sprinkler as 126 ft2. Using that, it was determined to cover the minimum area
of operation would require 12 sprinklers.
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Figure 27: NFPA 13 Table of Sprinkler Specifications for Ordinary Hazard Protection

Section 11.2.3.2.4 of the NFPA 13, the Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler
Systems, 2010 edition, states that for sloped ceilings, like that in the Center for the Arts’
main theater, “The system area of operation shall be increased by 30 percent without
revising the density…” when spray sprinklers are used on sloped ceilings with a pitch
exceeding 1 in 6, the equivalent of 15 degrees slope. The design area increase is based
on the sprinkler tests and modeling conducted at FM Global. In those tests, slopes greater
than 15 degrees resulted in erratic sprinkler operating patterns that could adversely affect
sprinklers operating outside the design area. Heat accumulated near the peak and tended
to activate sprinklers distant to the fire. The result was the potential for the sprinkler
system to be overwhelmed by the activation of too many heads threatening the system
with becoming ineffective at providing design area coverage. A 30 percent increase in
the coverage of the 15-foot maximum spacing set forth in Table 8.6.2.2.1(b) would
reduce the maximum spacing to 10.5 feet.

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

62

The slope of the ceiling near the sides of the main theater is approximately 25
degrees. In accordance with the provisions of Section 11.2.3.2.4 of NFPA 13, that slope
would trigger the 30 percent increase in coverage. As can be seen by the hydraulic
calculations prepared for the Center for the Arts building, the outer branch line spacing
on each side of the building was in fact reduced by 30 percent. The maximum distance
from the walls for the outer branch lines is established by Section 8.6.3.2.1 and Table
8.6.2.2.1(b), both of NFPA 13 as no more than half the distance between sprinklers, in
this case 10.5 feet. Actual distance of the outer branch lines was measured at 5 feet out
from the walls in adherence to this requirement.

Figure 28: Elevation view of the sprinkler system in the main theater looking south.
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Figure 29: Elevation view of the sprinkler system in the main theater looking west.
Unfortunately, no known plans exist for the installed sprinkler system. A search
of the records of the AHJ as well as by the Center for the Arts personnel failed to locate
any copies. The designer is reportedly no longer in business. A copy of a computerized
hydraulic calculation was available in the AHJ file. That record is presented in Appendix
D.

It shows the sizes of various pipes used in the calculations as well as fittings,

elevations, and other related values. The computer calculations estimated a water supply
demand at the base of the riser (BOR) of 245.8 gpm with a required pressure of 53.7 psi.
That coupled with a 250-gpm hose demand led to an overall demand of 495.8 gpm at
53.7 psi.
Activation of 12 sprinklers could involve 6 sprinklers on each of the furthest 2
branch lines or 4 heads on each of the furthest 3 lines or a combination thereof. Not
knowing which heads had activated in the computer calculations, hand estimates were
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performed to identify possibilities. It was estimated that the most geographically remote
heads would be on the furthest two or three branch lines to the west on the second floor.
Hand calculations determined that the highest demand was created when 4 sprinklers
opened on each of the 3 westernmost branch lines on the second floor. That demand was
calculated to be 245.3 gpm at 49.0 psi at the base of the riser (BOR) (see Appendix D for
calculations). The hose stream allowance for an Ordinary Hazard Group I occupancy is
250 gpm for 90 minutes. The total water demand for the building is therefore 495.3 gpm
at 49 psi.

These values were in reasonable agreement with those indicated in the

computerized calculations.

Inspection, Testing and Maintenance
Several inspection, testing and maintenance (ITM) requirements for the sprinkler
system in the Center for the Arts are set forth in NFPA 25, Inspection, Testing and
Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems and modified by Title 19 of the
California Code of Regulations. NFPA 25 contains three tables that generally summarize
ITM requirements. They are Tables 5.1.1.2, 6.1.1.2, and 13.1.1.2. Monthly observations
of the sprinkler system are the responsibility of the staff of the Center for the Arts. A
sprinkler contractor approved by the AHJ carries out annual inspections, testing and
maintenance. A table synopsizing the inspection, testing and maintenance requirements
for alarm systems set forth in NFPA 25 is included herein as Appendix E.
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Alarm Detection and Notification System
History
Like with the automatic sprinkler system, the Center for the Arts building was
not originally fitted with alarm detection or notification systems.

The first alarm

system components were installed sometime before the sprinkler system was required.
The only known alarm system requirement for the Center for the Arts is for a waterflow
alarm for the sprinkler system. That alarm and its ancillary components are currently in
place. Other than that however, there are no requirements for any alarm detection or
notification systems to be installed.
	
  

Requirements for Fire Detection and Alarm Systems
Neither the California Building Code (CBC), the California Fire Code (CFC) nor
the Life Safety Code (LSC), NFPA 101, have established requirements for alarm systems
to be installed into existing buildings like the Center for the Arts.

Section 907 of the

CFC specifies the rules and regulations regarding Fire Alarm and Detection Systems.
The LSC requirements for Detection, Alarm and Communication Systems are set forth in
Section 13.3.4.
LSC Section 13.3.4.1.1 states that “Assembly occupancies with occupant loads
of more than 300 and all theaters with more than one audience-‐viewing room hall be
provided with an approved fire alarm system… unless otherwise permitted…” (emphasis
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added).

Even though the Center for the Arts is an assembly occupancy with an

occupant load of more than 300 in the main theater, it is covered by an exception to that
requirement.

Section 13.3.4.1.4 of the LSC states, “The requirement of 13.3.4.1.1

shall not apply to assembly occupancies where, in the judgment of the authority having
jurisdiction, adequate alternative provisions exist or are provided for the discovery of a
fire and for alerting the occupants promptly.” In this instance, the local fire department
as the AHJ has deemed installation of most alarm systems unnecessary.
According to local fire inspectors with the AHJ, the Center for the Arts
technically falls under the latter exclusion because of other provisions in Section 907.3
of the CFC entitled, “Where required in existing buildings and structures”. In that, it
states that, “An approved fire alarm system shall be installed in existing buildings and
structures where required in Chapter 46”. Section 4603 of that code addresses “Fire
Safety Requirements for Existing Buildings.”

In 4603, the only requirements for fire

alarm systems in existing structure are for occupancy types other than those existing
in the Center for the Arts.

Further, it has been decided by local fire officials that the

building’ full coverage sprinkler protection in effect adds heat sensors in the form
of sprinkler heads.

While the AHJ might recommend a fire notification system be

installed throughout the building, under these provisions they cannot require such a
system be installed.
If Center for the Arts personnel choose to upgrade the existing or install a
different system to improve life safety conditions, they should first identify their goals
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and objectives for the system. NFPA 72 offers various features and functions in Section
23.3.3.1that owners may want to evaluate and consider as potentially applicable to the
building.
Since the building is protected by a water sprinkler system, both the CFC and
the LSC require that that system be monitored with a waterflow alarm. Section 903.4
of the CFC states, “All valves controlling the water supply for automatic sprinkler
systems, pumps, tanks, water levels and temperatures, critical air pressures and water-‐
flow switches on all sprinkler systems shall be electrically supervised by a listed fire
alarm control unit.”

Similarly, Section 9.6.2.1 of the LSC states, “Where required by

other sections of this Code, actuation of the complete fire alarm system shall be initiated
by, but shall not be limited to, any or all of the following means:

(1) Manual fire alarm initiation
(2) Automatic detection
(3) Extinguishing system operation (emphasis added).

In meeting this requirement, the Center for the Arts installed a waterflow alarm system
at the sprinkler riser.
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Installed Alarm System
Currently, two independent alarm detection and notification systems are installed
on the ground floor of the Center for the Arts. Each has its own fire alarm control panel.
No alarm system is present on the second floor besides local smoke detectors or as
related to activation of the waterflow alarm in the sprinkler system. Each of the two
alarm systems for the Center of the Arts are of the Supervising Station type connected by
telephone lines to a Central Station.
Though no documentation of installation could be found, the oldest of the two
alarm systems appears to be around 20 to 25 years old.

It originally consisted of a

mixture of smoke detection and a burglar alarm system. Though the smoke detectors are
still monitored by a central station, the burglar alarm portion of the system has been
deactivated.

The other system installed at the far north end of the building is located

primarily in and around the sprinkler room. It is designed to serve as both a detection and
notification system of sprinkler activation as well as detection and notification of fire
related problems in the sprinkler room that could affect the sprinkler system.
Unfortunately, no drawings or installation documentation for either of the two systems
was available either at the Center for the Arts or at the local fire department or are even
known to exist.
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Front System Detectors and Notification Appliances
The smoke detection and alarm notification system in and around the front lobby
currently covers only the first floor of the front portion of the building south of the main
theater. The fire alarm control panel connected to the original system is an Optex Morse
model SMDC- 16 unit.

It is also wired to an Optex Morse keypad and annunciator

panel.
	
  

	
  
Figure 30: Optex Morse SMDC-16 Fire Alarm Control Panel keypad for the front alarm
system
	
  
Those portions of the system designed to serve as a burglar alarm have been
disconnected.

The fire alarm control panel is monitored via telephone line by a

central station monitoring service.
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Five ionization smoke detectors are installed in the front portion of the
building, two in the front lobby, one in the office, one in the actors’ dressing “green”
room, and one in the art gallery. Four are similar in appearance to older style General
Electric 120V models although the exact model type could not be verified. The other
appears to be a BRK model 120V detector. Each of the detectors appears to be about
twenty years old. All of the front system smoke detectors are ceiling mounted except
for that in the art gallery.
	
  

	
  
Figure 31: Smoke detector on the front lobby ceiling	
  
The art gallery detector is wall mounted, 30 inches below a 12 foot 6 inch high
ceiling. That location is not in compliance with NFPA 72. Sections 17.7.3.2.1 dictate
that a smoke detector should be mounted within the top 12 inches of the room height.
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Even if the detector was mounted at the correct height on the wall or on the ceiling,
there would still be problems associated with having only one detector in the gallery.
Because the upper part of the gallery is divided into three bays separated by deep solid
beams, having only one detector in the room would not necessarily assure prompt
activation unless the fire started directly below the bay in which the detector was
mounted. If the fire started below another bay, then smoke would first have to fill that
bay and then spill out and flow into the bay with the detector before activation would
be assured.

Under the current arrangement, all three bays will have to fill with

smoke and then the level descend about six inches further to even reach the existing
detector.
	
  

	
  
Figure 32: Smoke detector mounted low on the north wall of the art gallery
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With regards to detector spacing in the front half of the building, since there was
no mandate for these detectors to be in the building, according to Section 17.5.3.3.1 of
NFPA 72, there is no prescribed spacing required for them. The existing arrangement
seems somewhat arbitrary other than that it covers the largest spaces in the front area.
The only notification appliance in the front half of the building is an Amseco
model BZ-‐54VT electric horn. It is mounted on the north wall of the lobby, 92 inches
above the floor, immediately below the drop ceiling. That wall separates the lobby and
the main theater. The mounting location does not fully meets the requirement of Section
18.4.8.1 even though it is located at least 90 inches above the finished floor. That section
also requires that it must be 6 inches below the ceiling.
	
  

	
  
Figure 33: Amseco model BZ-‐54VT electric horn in the front lobby
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The Fire alarm control panel for the front half of the building is also mounted on
the north wall of the lobby just below the ceiling, about 10 feet west of the horn. The
Optex Morse annunciator panel and keyboard is located further south on the west wall,
approximately 25 feet inside and north of the main entrance doors.

Rear System Detectors and Notification Appliances
The rear portion of the alarm system serves only to detect and notify occupants of
either sprinkler waterflow activation, or fire related problems in the sprinkler room that
could affect the system’s performance. The fire alarm control panel mounted there
is a model MS-‐5012 fire control communicator manufactured by Fire Lite Alarms, Inc.,
a division of Honeywell. Telephone lines connect the system to the central station
monitoring the system.
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Figure 34: FireLite MS-5012 fire alarm control panel
	
  
The principal detection device of that system is a Potter model VSR-‐4 waterflow
switch mounted in the sprinkler riser. Also installed in the sprinkler room is a 120V
smoke detector mounted on the wall nine feet above the floor, directly over the fire
alarm control panel.

The smoke detector is a Federal Signal model FSF109,

hardwired, photoelectric detector.	
   	
   	
   	
   Located immediately below the fire alarm control
panel in the sprinkler room is a Fire Lite Model BG-‐12 pull station.
One of the notification appliances attached to the rear fire alarm control panel is a
Gentex model GEC, 24-volt horn strobe with 75 cd and 70-‐82 dBA. That horn strobe is
mounted inside and along the north wall of the rear day theater of the Center for the Arts.
The unit is 86 inches above the floor but because of a temporarily stage set being used in
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the theater, it may not be visible at the front (south) side of the stage, either by
the audience or cast. The mounting height as well as the existing location behind a
possible blockage such as a stage set do not meet the location requirements of Section
18.4.8 of NFPA 72.
	
  

	
  
Figure 35: Gentex Model GEC Horn Strobe
Attached outside on the north wall of the building, 12 feet above the ground, is
a 10-‐inch vibrating bell manufactured by Potter Electric Signal Company, model
MBA2410.
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Figure 36: Potter Electric Signal Vibrating Bell
	
  
	
  

Fire Detection Scenarios
In order to estimate the time for detection in areas where smoke detectors are
installed, three fire detection scenarios were examined. The time to detection was
analyzed either with the computer zone fire model CFAST for wall mounted detectors or
with the spreadsheet model, DETACT. The specific calculations and results are included
in Appendix E.
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Central Station Disposition of Alarm, Supervisory and Trouble
Signals
The fire alarm system installed in the Center for the Arts is a Supervising Station
alarm type monitored by a central station. Signals are passed to the central station via
telephone lines installed at each of the two fire alarm control panels.
NFPA 72 dictates the requirements for central stations to respond to alarm
signals. A synopsis of those signals and the corresponding actions to be taken are
discussed in Appendix E.

Mass Notification System
The Center for the Arts does not have a Mass Notification System installed.	
  

Secondary Power Requirements
Each of the two alarm systems installed in the Center for the Arts is required by
NFPA 72 to have backup power sources to maintain the alarm systems in the event of a
power outage. Both fire alarm control panels are outfitted with 8 amp-hour portable
batteries f o r this purpose.

Section 10.5.6.3.1 of NFPA 72 states that, “The

secondary power supply shall have sufficient capacity to operate the system under
quiescent load (system operating in a non-alarm condition) for a minimum of 24
hours and, at the end of that period, shall be capable of operating all alarm notification
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appliances used for evacuation or to direct aid to the location of an emergency for 5
minutes…”
Accurate standby power requirements for the smoke detectors at the Center for
the Arts could not be determined because there currently is no known documentation
identifying the installed detectors. Accordingly, estimates of the power requirements for
the smoke detectors were obtained for those of similar devices described in online
references. The notification appliances needing to be powered include the horn in the
front lobby and horn strobe and vibrating bell for the rear system. Power requirements
for those notification appliances were either obtained off the individual appliances or off
data sheets available from the suppliers.
Wiring for the rear circuits was readily accessible and determined to be 14 AWG
copper size. The front system wiring was hidden in the walls and therefore not visible
without removing the ceiling and/or disassembling the system.

At the time of

examinations, the Center for the Arts was open and conducting business. Accordingly no
disassembly occurred.

Instead, estimations of the power requirements for the front

system have been made based upon similar wiring (14 AWG solid copper conductors)
used elsewhere.
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Front Alarm System Secondary Power Requirement
Item

Description

A

Ionization
Smoke Detector
SMDC-16
FACP
SMDC-32
Annunciator
BZ-54VT Horn

B
C
D

TOTALS

Qty Standby
Current
per Unit
(amps)

Total
Standby
Current
(amps)

Alarm
Current
per Unit
(amps)

5

0.0002

0.001

0.077

Total
System
Alarm
Current
(amps)
0.385

1

0.113

0.113

0.20

0.20

1

0.070

0.070

0.07

0.07

1

None

None

0.12

0.12

0.184A

0.775A

Table 4: Front Alarm System Secondary Power Requirement
24 hours standby x 0.184A = 4.416 Ah
0.0833 hours (5 mins) alarm x 0.775 A = 0.065 Ah
Standby + Alarm power requirement = 4.48 Ah
Power requirement x 1.2 (20% Safety factor) = 5.4 Ah
Total Secondary Power Requirement for the front system is 5.4 Ah
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Rear Alarm System Secondary Power Requirement
Item

Description

E
F
G
H
I
J

MS-5012 FACP
FSF109 Smoke Det
BG-12 Pull Station
GEC Horn Strobe
MBA2410 Vib-Bell
VSR-4 WF Switch

TOTAL

Qty Standby
Current
per Unit
(amps)
1
1
1
1
1
1

Total
Standby
Current
(amps)

Alarm
Current
per Unit
(amps)

Total
System
Alarm
Current
(amps)

0.01
0.0001
None
None
None
0.010

0.005
0.13
None
0.137
0.060
0.010

0.005
0.13
None
0.137
0.060
0.010

0.01
0.0001
None
None
None
0.010

0.0201A

0.322A

Table 5: Rear Alarm System Secondary Power Requirement
24 hrs standby x 0.0201A = 0.48 Ah
0.0833 hrs (5 mins) alarm x 0.322 A = 0.03 Ah
Standby + Alarm power requirement = 0.51 Ah
Power Requirement x 1.2 (20% Safety factor) = 0.61 Ah
Total Secondary Power Requirement for the rear system is 0.61 Ah
Both the front and rear alarm systems are supplied with 8.0 Ah batteries. In each case,
the secondary power supply is sufficient to power the systems in accordance with Section
10.5.6.3.1 of NFPA 72.
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Inspection, Testing and Maintenance
A local electric company maintains the Center for the Arts’ alarm system and
conducts all necessary inspections and testing. This is allowed under Section 14.2.2.3 of
NFPA 72 if conducted pursuant to a written contract.

None of the facilities or

maintenance personnel at the Center for the Arts was familiar with specifics of the alarm
system in terms of installation or the maintenance.

Further, they stated that they have

never seen any copies of installation diagrams or paperwork associated with either of the
two alarm systems and do not know if any exists. They suggested copies might be
available at either the alarm system contractor or the fire department. Checks with both
organizations revealed neither have copies either installation diagrams or commissioning
documentation.
Section 14.2.4 of the 2010 edition of NFPA 72 requires that “At the time of an
acceptance test, the authority having jurisdiction and the system contractor must ensure
that all documentation for the system installation has been completed and is presented to
the owner or the owner’s designated representative in a usable format.” Whether this was
ever done is uncertain. Documents suggested to be maintained by NFPA 72 include:
Fire Alarm System Record of Completion, Point to Point Wiring Diagrams, Individual
Device Interconnection Drawings, As-Built Drawings, Copy of Original Equipment
Submittals, Operational Manuals, Manufacturer’s Proper Testing and Maintenance
Requirements, and a Device Address List/Conventional Device Location List.

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

82

Besides the documentation requirements, Sections 14.1 and 14.2 of NFPA 72 also
sets forth the requirements for an inspection, testing and maintenance programs for new
and existing alarm systems. Table 14.3.1, Visual Inspection Frequencies, prescribes the
requirements for visual inspection. With regards to the installed equipment, the visual
inspection requirements that apply to the Center for the Art’s system are shown in
Appendix E.
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Structural Fire Protection
General Building Construction
The Center for the Arts was built of Type III construction, commonly referred to
as “Ordinary Construction”. It occupies slightly less than 19,000 square feet. First floor
space measures about 13,900 square feet while the second floor is approximately 4,750
square feet. The building’s maximum height is approximately 28 feet.
Table 503 of the California Building Code specifies maximum building heights
and areas for various construction types.

It specifies that a building of Type III-A

construction can have a maximum height of 65 feet, contain three stories and for an
Assembly, type A-1, occupancy (which includes theaters), have a maximum floor area of
14,000 square feet. Type III-B construction can be used to create a similar occupancy
building with a maximum height of 55 feet, two stories and 8,500 square feet. (The other
occupancy types found in the Center for the Arts are less restrictive for both Type III-A
and III-B buildings and can include more area). Based upon area increase provisions set
forth in Section 506 of the CBC, the presence of sprinkler protection and open frontage
areas onto public ways increases the allowable per floor area of the building. For the
Center for the Arts, the area allowed for Type III-A construction is more than 42,600
square feet per story and to 25,840 square feet per story for Type III-B. This is because
the building is sprinklered and has almost 200 feet of its 670-foot perimeter opening onto
an open area of more than 30 feet in width.
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Calculations to determine the increase in the floor area for each type of
construction are as follows:

Frontage Increase
If = [F/P – 0.25] W / 30
Where:

If = Area increase due to frontage (percent)
F = Building perimeter which fronts public way or open space having 20 foot
minimum width.
P = Perimeter of the building.
W = Minimum width of public way or open space.
For the Center for the Arts:
F ~ 195 feet
P ~ 670 feet
W = 30 feet (since all open areas > 30 feet wide)

Therefore, the increase in floor space because of available public frontage is:
If = [195/670 – 0.25] 30/ 30
If = 0.04 or 4%
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Sprinkler Increase
Section 506.3 of the CBC also provides for an area increase in buildings protected
with an approved automatic sprinkler system. The increase, Is is 200 percent for multistoried buildings.
Section 506 of the CBC sets the calculation for the total area modification as:
Aa = {At + [At x If] + [At x Is]}
Where:
Aa = Allowable building area per story (square feet).
At = Tabular building area per story in accordance with Table 503 (square feet).

For the most restrictive occupancy found in the Center for the Arts, Assembly (A-1), the
tabular area is 14,000 sq. ft. for Type III-A and 8,500 sq. ft for Type III-B construction.

If = Area increase factor due to frontage as calculated in accordance with Section
506.2, in this case 4%.
Is = Area increase factor due to sprinkler protection as calculated in accordance
with Section 506.3.

For the Center for the Arts, the area modification for Type III-A construction is:
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Aa = {At + [At x If] + [At x Is]}
Aa = {14000’ + [14000’ x 0.04] + [14000’ x 2]}
Aa = 42,560 sq. ft.
For Type III-B, the area is:
Aa = {At + [At x If] + [At x Is]}
Aa = {8500’ + [8500’ x 0.04] + [8500’ x 2]}
Aa = 25,840 sq. ft.

According to these area allowances and the permitted height and number of stories for
both Type III-A and III-B construction, the Center for the Arts may be of either type.

Fire Resistance Ratings
Table 601 of the CBC (shown below) sets forth the minimum fire resistance
building element requirements for various construction types. Type III-A construction
requires a 2-hour fire resistance rating for exterior structural bearing walls, and a 1-hour
fire resistance rating for interior bearing walls, floors and roof construction. Non-bearing
interior walls and partitions require no fire resistance rating. Type III-B construction has
no fire resistance requirement for any elements other than for exterior bearing walls
which like in Type III-A is also 2 hours. Because there are no interior bearing walls,
these requirements are met throughout the building.
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BUILDING
ELEMENT
Primary
structural frameg
(see Section 202)
Bearing Walls
Exteriorf,g
Interior
Nonbearing walls
and partitions
Exterior
Nonbearing walls
and partitions
Interiore
Floor
construction and
secondary
members (see
Section 202)
Roof
construction and
secondary
members (see
Section 202)

TYPE I
A
B

TYPE II
Ad
B

TYPE III
Ad
B

TYPE IV
HT

TYPE V
Ad
B

3a

2a

1

0

1

0

HT

1

0

3
3a

2
2a

1
1

0
0

2
1

2
0

2
1/HT

1
1

0
0

0

0

See Table 602
0

0

0

0

0

0

See
Section
602.4.6

2

2

1

0

1

0

HT

1

0

11/2b

1b,c

1b,c

0c

1b,c

0

HT

1b,c

0

Figure 37: Table 601, California Building Code, 2010 edition
For SI: 1 foot = 304.8 mm.
a. Roof supports: Fire-resistance ratings of primary structural frame and bearing walls are permitted to be
reduced by 1 hour where supporting a roof only.
b1. Except in Group A, E, F-1, H, I, L, M, R-1, R-2, R-2.1 and S-1 occupancies, high-rise buildings, and
other applications listed in Section 1.11 regulated by the Office of the State Fire Marshal, fire protection of
structural members shall not be required, including protection of roof framing and decking where every
part of the roof construction is 20 feet or more above any floor immediately below. Fire-retardant-treated
wood members shall be allowed to be used for such unprotected members.
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b2. For Group A, E, I, L, R-1, R-2, and R-2.1 occupancies, high-rise buildings, and other applications
listed in Section 1.11 regulated by the Office of the State Fire Marshal, fire protection of members other
than the structural frame shall not be required, including protection of roof framing and decking where
every part of the roof construction is 20 feet or more above any floor immediately below. Fire-retardanttreated wood members shall be allowed to be used for such unprotected members.
b3. One-story portions of Group A and E assembly occupancies the roof-framing system of Type II A or
Type III A construction may be of unprotected construction when such roof-framing system is open to the
assembly area and does not contain concealed spaces.
c. In all occupancies, heavy timber shall be allowed where a 1-hour or less fire-resistance rating is required.
d. An approved automatic sprinkler system in accordance with Section 903.3.1.1 shall be allowed to be
substituted for 1-hour fire-resistance-rated construction, provided such system is not otherwise required by
other provisions of the code or used for an allowable area increase in accordance with Section 506.3 or an
allowable height increase in accordance with Section 504.2. The 1-hour substitution for the fire resistance
of exterior walls shall not be permitted.
e. Not less than the fire-resistance rating required by other sections of this code.
f. Not less than the fire-resistance rating based on fire separation distance (see Table 602).
g. Not less than the fire-resistance rating as referenced in Section 704.10

Exterior Walls
The exterior walls of the Center for the Arts consist of 8-inch thick, filled,
masonry block units except where there are windows or doors facing onto public areas
more than 30 feet deep.

Fire Separation Requirements
The west wall of the Center for the Arts is approximately 8 feet from the closest
building. The north end of the east wall is separated from an adjacent garage by less than
2 feet. At the building’s south end, the nearest building lies 30 feet away from the east
wall (see Figure 38).
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Figure 38: Building Separation Layout
The Sections of Table 602 of the CBC dealing with the occupancy classifications
for the Center of the Arts as shown below list the fire resistance ratings required of
exterior walls based upon fire separation distance. For the Center for the Arts, this fire
resistance rating is 1 hour.
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FIRE
SEPARATION
DISTANCE = X
(feet)
X < 5c
5 ≤ X< 10

10 ≤ X< 30
X ≥ 30

TYPE OF
CONSTRUCTION
All
IA
Others
IA, IB
IIB, VB
Others
All

OCCUPANCY
GROUP A, B, E, F-2, I,
R,S-2g, Ub
1
1
1
1d
0
1d
0

Figure 39: Calif. Building Code Table 602 - Fire-resistance rating requirements for
exterior walls based on fire separation distance
The exterior walls of the Center for the Arts are grouted and filled concrete
blocks. Determining the effective fire resistive thickness of a normally hollow unit such
as a concrete block, one multiplies the thickness of the block by its solid percentage using
the formula:

Te = Tn * P

Te = Equivalent Thickness
Tn = Nominal thickness of block
P = Percent solid
The 8-inch thick, exterior walls were examined by sounding and estimated to be
completely solid. Section 721.3.1.4 of the CBC states that for airspaces and cells of
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concrete block filled with loose-fill material, “The equivalent thickness of completely
filled hollow concrete masonry is the actual thickness of the unit when loose-fill
materials are: sand, pea gravel crushed stone or slag; pumices, scoria, expanded shale,
expanded clay, expanded slate, expanded slag, expanded fly ash or cinders… or perlite or
vermiculite…” Accordingly, the Center for the Art’s 8-inch exterior block walls are
estimated to have an equivalent concrete thickness of 8 inches. According to Table
720.1(2) of the CBC, the minimum fire resistance rating for the 8-inch block wall is well
over 4 hours.
The structural framing supporting the concrete block walls consisted of concrete
block lintels attached to the inside of the exterior walls and positioned under the end of
each roof truss (8 inch x 20 inch wooden, glulam arched trusses). It is presumed but
could not be verified that the lintels contained structural steel within the concrete blocks.
Because of their apparent construction, the fire resistance of the lintels is the same as the
exterior walls.
Tables 601 and 602 shows that the exterior walls and the primary structural frame
support of the Center for the Arts meet all fire resistance and fire separation distance
rating requirements for both Type III-A and III-B construction.

Interior Walls
Interior walls throughout the second floor at the front of the building are wood
framed walls covered with gypsum board. No plans for the as-built construction were
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available for examination.

The majority of interior walls appeared to be non-weight

bearing and serving only as partitions. Based upon the wall thickness, the studs are
estimated to be either 3-1/3 or 5-1/2 inches thick, the same thickness as nominal 2x4 or
2x6 wooden boards (presumably spaced 16 inches on center allowing for 20 minutes of
protection). Sheetrock panels appear either ½ inch or 5/8 inch thick. The wall fire rating
can be determined using Table 721.6.2(1) of the IBC. The ratings for ½ inch thick are 15
minutes for non Type X wallboard or 25 minutes ½ inch Type X. For 5/8 -inch wallboard,
the fire resistance is 30 minutes for non Type X wall board or 40 minutes for Type X.
Calculations using the component additive method show the following fire resistance:

Wallboard Type

Combined Fire Resistance (mins)

½ inch regular + wood studs

35 mins

½ inch Type X + wood studs

45 mins

5

/8 inch regular + wood studs

50 mins

5

/8 inch Type X + wood studs

60 mins

To meet Type III-A fire resistance requirements, all interior, bearing walls would
be required to have at least 5/8 inch Type X sheetrock on wooded studs 16 inches on
center if no sprinkler system was installed. With the sprinkler system however, a 1-hr
rating can be achieved because of the sprinkler thus alleviating the need for a more robust
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fire resistance rating based on structural member types alone.

The presence of the

sprinklers raises the Center for the Arts construction type from what would normally be a
Type III-B building to Type III-A.
The first floor interior walls in the front half of the building are of various
construction types. Original wall sections appear to be lath and plaster while later
additions look like sheetrock on wooden or steel studs. Again, no plans for the as-built
construction were available for examination.

Those that might potentially be weight

bearing walls appeared to be sheathed in plaster instead of sheetrock. Those walls must
have a 1-hour rating for Type III-A construction but with Type III-B construction have no
fire resistance requirements. The presence of the sprinkler system automatically meets
the 1-hour requirement for interior walls.
The two-story wall separating the main theater from the front of the building is
approximately 7 inches thick. It has several unsealed penetrations for HVAC ducting,
piping, a double door and single door. With Type III-B construction no fire resistance
rating is required for the wall and these open penetrations are permissible. For Type IIIA however, the wall, doors and penetrations would each have to have a 1-hour fire
resistance rating. If the wall and door in the wall did in fact meet a 1-hour fire rating, the
double door could be used as a horizontal exit from the main theater. While the presence
of a sprinkler offers a 1-hour resistance rating in general, it does not elevate the condition
of the wall to meet the requirements of a horizontal exit.
The rear (north) wing of the complex has three spaces separated by 8-inch thick,

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

94

concrete block bearing walls. Two of the spaces are used for storage of theater props and
equipment and one contains a day theater, waiting room, dressing rooms and restrooms.
The smaller rooms have partition walls of sheetrock over 2x4 studs. The north wing
meets the previously discussed fire resistance requirements for both Type III-A and III-B
construction.

Roof
The roof framework in the southern half of the building consists of wooden
planking on an arched, wooden truss framework. On the second story at the front of the
building, trusses are bolted with metal bolts. Over the main theater space, the framework
is of laminated wooden arched trusses measuring 8 inches wide by 20 inches deep. The
trusses over the theater do not have a bottom chord. The roof decking for a Type III-A
building requires a 1-hour fire resistance rating. There is no roofing fire resistance
requirement for a Type III-B building.

Like with other sections of the building, there

were no drawings to examine roof specifications. Roof construction appeared to be
tongue and groove planks supported on the trusses and covered on the exterior with a
rolled, aluminized tar and gravel covering. Paper-sided fiberglass insulation batts are
suspended under the roof planks and exposed from below.
The construction of the Center for the Arts’ roof appears to meet both Type III-A
and III-B fire resistance requirements based upon section 721.6.2(4) of the CBC.
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Floors
The first floor throughout the structure is concrete either on grade or supported in
a perimeter concrete foundation. Various floor coverings are installed over the concrete.
The second story floor at the front of the building appears to be poured concrete slabs
supported by plaster encased beams of an unknown type. Table 601 of the CBC calls for
a 1-hour fire resistance floor rating for Type III-A construction. No such rating is needed
for Type III-B. Though no plans were available to view, the flooring for the second story
appears to offer at least a 1-hour rating. Again, the presence of the sprinkler system
automatically can be substituted for a 1-hour fire resistance rating except for exterior
walls.

Structural Fire Protection Summary
The Center for the Arts meets the size, height, and area requirements of Type IIIB construction throughout. With the existing sprinkler protection, it also meets the Type
III-A requirements. The only fire resistance rating requirements needed to achieve this
construction type classification is a 2-hour rating for the exterior bearing walls. The 8inch, filled, concrete block walls easily meet this requirement.
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Performance Based Analysis
Tenability Analysis

Fire protection in the Center for the Arts relies predominantly on fire prevention
as well as prompt and safe egress of occupants. Though installed, the automatic sprinkler
system is not designed to extinguish a fire, but simply to control one should it occur until
local firefighters can respond. Sprinklers do not guarantee complete safety to occupants.
Instead they are intended to add extra time to that available for safe egress. One question
that must be addressed is how much additional time is provided.
In conducting a performance-based analysis on the Center for the Arts to evaluate
RSET vs. ASET, four fire scenarios were considered. Three were in the main theater and
one was in the rear theater. These locations were selected because of the likelihood they
would have the biggest impact on the greatest number of people in terms of evacuation.
Section 5.2 of the Life Safety Code specifies the types of performance criteria that
can be used to evaluate fire protection designs. One of the aspects to be examined in
such analyses is whether the particular facility can meet tenability performance criteria.
To do so, one must demonstrate that any occupant not intimate with a fire’s ignition will
not be exposed to instantaneous or cumulative untenable conditions as specified in
Section 5.2.2.
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One of the methods suggested by the Life Safety code for estimating whether a
building or design meets tenability-related performance criteria is to determine for
specific design fire scenarios, whether each room will be fully evacuated before the
smoke or toxic gas layer descends to within 6 feet above the floor. This method involves
evaluation of the location, behavior and movements of occupants as well.
This method was used in conducting the performance-based tenability analysis of
the Center for the Arts. Initial reviews showed that for each of several design fire
scenarios, smoke levels would likely descend within minutes to below 6 feet above the
floor or other walking surfaces on which people would be located. Accordingly, the
required evacuation times (RSET) for maximum occupant loading in the theaters were
examined based on specific tenability criteria at or below 6 feet above the floor.
Tenability limits are often specified in terms of four criteria:

visibility,

temperature, radiant exposure and combustion gas toxicity. Determining the level of
exposure to each can be based on somewhat subjective evaluations. For this analysis,
untenable conditions were determined to exist when the following values of each criteria
were reached:

Visibility

< 10 meters

Temperature

>120°C in dry conditions
>60°C in moist conditions

Radiant Flux

>2.5 kW/m2

Carbon Monoxide

>1,200 ppm
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The visibility tenability value selected for passage through smoke such as in
corridors or other escape routes was based on work done by Sherfig13 and

Hadjisophocleous14. In their research, they suggest a visibility limit of at least 10
meters. This value agrees with suggested values obtained from various documents
such as the SFPE Handbook and the International Fire Engineering Guidelines for
large enclosures. As Hadjisophocleous points out, in a primary room such as an
office or familiar living space, this value may be dropped down to 3 meters. Purser
in the SFPE Handbook suggests a limit of 5 meters in smaller spaces. Certainly the
larger value provides a safety margin for less confusion during egress.
With regards to temperature, a maximum air temperature of 120°C was
considered since that is the point at which skin exposed to dry, convected air will
start to feel pain or burn in more than 60 seconds14-15. The corresponding value for
moist air is actually lower, closer to 60°C. After conducting computer-modeling runs
of fire scenarios in the Center for the Arts, it became clear that for people not in
intimate contact with fires in the scenarios, exposure to temperatures in excess of 120
°C value was unlikely. 60°C was reached in some of the scenarios and since it
usually occurred after sprinkler heads activated, the air was moist with suppression
water. Accordingly, that value was chosen to represent untenability.
Similarly, the tenability limit for radiant heat flux was set at 2.5 kW/m2.
Babrauskas is listed in the SFPE Handbook16 as choosing a maximum heat flux of
2.5 kW/m2 as a tenability limit for radiant exposure. That is a commonly accepted
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level at which bare skin will generally feel pain. Conditions of lower intensity should
limit the onset of burns over a short period of time as well as limit damage to the
respiratory tracts of people trying to escape.
The CO level of 1,200 ppm was chosen because at that level, a 30-minute
exposure will cause incapacitation16. Shorter time exposures such as the RSETs that
might be expected for areas through the Center for the Arts might be allowed to go
higher.

A 5-minute exposure at 6,000 ppm would be expected to cause

incapacitation so a lower value of 4,000-ppm exposure as a tenability limit for small
spaces would be appropriate. In evaluating the various design fire scenarios for the
Center of the Arts, CO levels remained well within acceptable levels by the time
other factors became untenable.
The performance based analysis conducted for this evaluation of the Center for
the Arts was not done in order to evaluate a particular or specific fire protection system.
It was instead done to ascertain available safe egress times and compare it with the
required safe egress times identified for various locations in the building. The analyses
were conducted using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), Version 5, a computer fire model
published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. FDS is capable of
estimating tenability limit values. Because of the complex building geometry associated
with the arched roofs and vertical fuels such as stage curtains, Pyrosim, a graphical user
interface for FDS was also used to import computer aided drawing (CAD) files created
during this effort. Pyrosim then converted the drawing files into the necessary computer
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input coding needed required to run the FDS model.
Four design fire scenarios were developed for the performance-based analysis.
Each was chosen based upon realistic fire possibilities that were identified after visiting
the Center for the Arts. Criteria discussed in Section 5.5 of the Life Safety Code were
used to select appropriate scenarios specific to this facility. The selections were made to
simulate both high and low consequence fires as well as a special problem identified in
the theater. Available fuels as well as potential ignition sources were evaluated and
selected based upon their likelihood of occurring as well as the threat to life safety. Each
fire scenario involved a T-squared fire growing at rates associated with other fire tests.
The first three scenarios are set in the main theater. The fourth scenario occurs in
the rear theater. It should be stressed that the fire growth rates are based upon the time a
fire would grow after established burning occurred. A slow incipient phase during which
a fire initially burned with very small flames until starting to grow more rapidly would
result in a longer fire growth. In an actual fire, it is often difficult to estimate the time
leading to established burning.

Such a delay actually benefits the occupants of a

particular scenario because it tends to increase the ASET for evacuation to safety.

Scenario 1
Scenario 1 involves a fire that starts at the south end of the main theater
underneath stacks of chairs used by the Center for the Arts staff for portable seating. The
chairs are a mix of thermoplastic molded chairs as well as metal and wood framed chairs
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with polyurethane foam padding in the seat and covered with a synthetic fabric. Chairs
often stacked 10 high have been seen stored alongside the south edge of the fixed seating
platform in the eight foot wide space between the seating and the south wall of the
theater.

Figure 40: Space south of the main theater fixed seating platform and the south wall of
the theater. This area is commonly used to stack portable chairs for storage.
A fire was selected that starts under the stacks of chairs near the east wall, perhaps
through human means. A peak heat release rate of 1,500 kW was chosen based upon
familiarity with fires involving similar fuels in various test fires or examined in previous
investigations. A 60 second growth rate was selected based upon the configuration of the
fuels. Stacked plastic commodities have been shown to achieve such high growth rates.
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This fire is consistent with Design Fire Scenario 1 specified in the Section 5.5.3.1 of the
Life Safety Code.

Scenario 2
The second scenario fire also occurs in the main theater. Upholstered sofas are
situated in the lounge area at the north of the fixed seating and south of the northern
storage rooms. They are available for visitors’ use before or after productions. A fire
was selected that occurred adjacent to one of the sofas and peaked at 100 kW in about 30
seconds similar to a trash can fire. Again, these values were selected as reasonable based
upon personal experience with fire testing related to various investigations. Material
properties were chosen for upholstered furniture with polyurethane foam cushions that
have been shown in previous fire modeling efforts to be reasonable in terms of supporting
ignition from open flaming as well as flame spread across the item.
This fire is consistent with Design Fire Scenario 5 specified in the Section 5.5.3.5
of the Life Safety Code although it involves a smaller fire threat. While it is not
completely shielded from suppression systems, the location of the fire between two
sprinklers on a sloped roof reveals the concern with sprinkler activation elsewhere than
over the fire.

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

103

Figure 41: View of the main theater lounge area and upholstered sofas

Scenario 3
The third scenario fire is also in the main theater but on the platform/stage. Two
relatively large gymnasium-type mats are stored at the northwest corner of the
platform/stage between the separating wall to the northwest storage rooms and the
northernmost three stage curtains. The mats measure approximately six foot long by five
feet wide and about four feet high.

Clamp on portable, electric lights have been seen

positioned directly above the mats.

Additionally, several strands of power to both

lighting fixtures and audio accessories are often run above the stage. A catastrophic
failure in one of the lighting fixtures or other electrical equipment above and dropping
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onto the mats is the presumed fire cause.
A peak heat release rate of 2,000 kW was selected along with an ultra-fast growth
rate. Full-scale fire tests by Professor Mowrer conducted several years earlier to examine
the fire growth of gymnasium mats were relied upon to estimate this fire curve20. It was
decided that sprinkler activation would likely occur not long after ignition because of the
relatively small 8-foot distance between the top of the mat and the closest sprinkler head.
Again, the uncertainty in the fire growth rate with regards to prediction of available safe
egress time makes the establishment of an actual ASET value difficult. Even so, it still
provides an indication of anticipated fire and smoke spread as well as the sprinkler
system response.

Figure 42: Polyurethane foam gym mats stored at the north side of the platform/stage
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As with the sofa in Scenario 2, material properties for the mats were chosen based
upon common values for polyurethane foam that has been shown in previous fire
modeling efforts to be reasonably accurate.

Identifying specific material properties

would involve actual testing of the material, perhaps in a cone or full-scale oxygen
consumption calorimeter to determine the peak heat release rate, burning rate and flame
spread characteristics. This fire is consistent with Design Fire Scenario 6 specified in the
Section 5.5.3.6 of the Life Safety Code. It is perhaps the most severe, rapidly developing
fire possible at the Center of the Arts affecting a large number of occupants.

Scenario 4
In scenario 4, a fire starts at the rear of the seating platform in the rear theater
adjacent to the production control booth. The seats used in the rear theater are loosely
situated on the platform but are generally touching to maximize seating capacity. As in
the portable chairs used in the main theater, the chairs consist of a metal frame and a
wooden seat cushioned with polyurethane foam padding and covered with a synthetic
fabric.

Numerous electrical lines run in and around the control booth to control the

lighting and sound inside the theater. While a specific failure mode was not identified, an
accidental ignition by one of these power sources was presumed.
Fire modeling was conducted based on a fire growth curve with a 400 kW peak in
60 seconds. Material properties for the chairs were the same as those selected for similar
chairs stacked in the main theater in scenario 1. This fire is also consistent with Design
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Fire Scenario 5 specified in the Section 5.5.3.5 of the Life Safety Code. While the fire is
not completely shielded from suppression systems, the location of the fire at the rear of
the seating platform below the seats represents limitations of sprinkler effectiveness when
water is shielded from the base of a fire. Water from the closest sprinkler head is blocked
in part both by the theater control booth as well as the chairs.

Figure 43: Rear theater seating platform and the adjacent theater control booth behind it
The following assumptions were made in evaluating each of the four scenarios:
-

That the automatic sprinkler system is fully functional.

-

That theatrical productions are underway at the times of the fires.

The

theaters are darkened with sound at production levels higher than normal,
ambient conditions.
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-

That only a single fire start occurs in each instance rather than multiple,
concurrent fire sets that might result from an intensive and aggressive act of
arson.

-

That the rooms in which the fires start are at maximum occupancy levels.

-

That once fire-room occupants start evacuating, word of the fire spreads
between people throughout the building and that evacuations of other rooms
also commence.

-

That in the first three scenarios in the main theater, occupants of the second
floor discharge through the front exit onto the street and not through the
theater.
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Computer Fire Modeling – Design Fire Simulations
Scenario 1
A 1,500 kW peak HRR fire with a 60 second growth rate burns below the rear
stacks of chairs south of the main theater fixed seating near the east wall. The fire is
centered under four adjacent stacks of chairs. The first sprinkler activates at around 69
seconds at the closest head to the south wall of the theater on the easternmost and lowest
branch line. A grid size of between 0.2 m and 0.22 m on a side was used throughout the
main theater domain.

Figure 44: HRR Curve from SFPE Handbook for stackable, polypropylene chairs
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Figure 45: HRR Curve from SFPE Handbook for stackable, metal-framed, upholstered
chairs
Figures 44 and 45 were examined to determine an appropriate growth rate for the
scenario. The growth of the scenario was based upon the assumption that established
burning would occur at time = 0. Though that might be an overly aggressive assumption
considering the variety of ignition sources that might start more slowly, the result is
representative of a worst-case condition. The peak heat release rate for the fire scenario
was based upon the heat release rate of a such a fire at the time of sprinkler activation
determined by the model.
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Figure 46: Heat release rate for scenario 1. Sprinkler activation occurs at about 69
seconds
A graph of the heat release rate calculated by the model and affected by the
sprinkler activation shows that even though the fire was spreading through and involving
the chairs, the effects of the sprinkler controlled the fire to a HRR just above 1,500 kW.
This is consistent with expected fire growth in stacked commodities where water may not
reach lower, protected fuels to extinguish fires, but still controls the fire, limiting further
growth.
Since there are no fire alarms or notification devices in the main theater, the
detection and notification times can only be estimated. Certainly the activation of a
sprinkler head at the southeast corner of the theater would serve to notify people there.
Smoke from the fire would also likely alert people seated near the south end of the fixed
seating even before sprinkler activation. Detection time was estimated as 30 seconds
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after ignition. Since the fire is not located near the stage, it is unlikely that visitors would
confuse it as being part of a production and will begin moving soon after recognizing the
threat. Presumably they would begin warning others and the production staff would raise
the lighting and cut sound to hasten notification.

Under these circumstances, the

combination of detection/Notification and pre-movement times estimated at 1 minute.
According to the movement calculations shown under the egress section, the
minimum time needed to evacuate the main theater if both exit doors are available is 2.6 2.75 minutes. If only one door is available, then the time is closer to 3.3 minutes. It was
assumed that both exit doors would be opened for Scenario 1 at about 30 seconds after
ignition and would remain open for the entire simulation.
With all times combined, the RSET for this scenario is approximately 3.6 minutes
to 4.3 minutes. A review of the ASET for Scenario 1 shows that the limiting factor for
tenability is visibility. Thermal conditions and CO concentrations remained satisfactory
beyond the time that visibility dropped. The maximum temperatures at 6 feet above the
floor other than at the actual fire were below 40°C. The maximum CO concentration in
the simulation was about 100 parts per million, about 1/10th of untenable levels. Similar
trends occurred in scenarios 2 and 3.
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Figure 47: Scenario 1 - View from south wall of main theater. Stacked chairs are shown
to the right in green and tan.
Figure 47 is a representation of the FDS output as generated by the Smokeview
graphics program.

Perimeter wall sections have been rendered invisible for easier

viewing. The blue sections at the left of the graphic represents the theater curtains on the
platform/stage. The arched roof and other structural elements are depicted in white and
grey. Because FDS is based upon a rectilinear format (squares, rectangles and boxes),
the shape of curved surfaces such as the arched roof of the Center for the Arts are
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estimated by creating numerous rectangular sections and stepping them in an offset
fashion from adjacent blocks.

Figure 48: Time = 69.9 seconds just after initial sprinkler activation
Figure 48 shows that shortly after 1 minute of burn, the buoyant smoke has
reached the opposite side of the theater, its momentum driving it below the arched roof
level. Note that the rear exit from the second floor, the top landing of which can be seen
in white in front of the dark blue theatrical curtains, is already engulfed in smoke over its
upper section. A person attempting to egress down those stairs, even though it’s unlikely
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they would have been alerted to a fire within a minute, would be immersed in smoke
upon opening the door.

Figure 49: Time = 2 minutes after fire start. Two sprinkler heads activated.
Within two minutes after ignition, smoke levels descend to near floor level along
the south side of the fixed seating platform. Suppression water not only limits the fire
growth but also cools the smoke, thus reducing its buoyancy. The second floor rear exit
stairs are visible towards the left side of the graphic, with the top half of them enveloped
in smoke.
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Figure 50: Slice file depicting the visibility 6 feet above the theater floor
The slice file in Figure 50 displays visibility conditions 6 feet above the floor two
minutes after ignition, the same time as the previous figure. The dark smoke has been
removed from the graphic to enhance the view. Areas shown in light and dark blue
represent locations where the visibility has fallen below the selected tenability limit of 10
meters.
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Figure 51: Northern view slice file showing visibility at a 6 foot height above the floor
This slice shows conditions about 229 seconds after ignition. Visibility over
much of the elevated seating platform is well below 10 meters. Some of the area above
the fixed seating is actually less than 6 feet above the platform aisles since the 6 foot
measurement is referenced to the theater floor.
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Fire Timeline – Scenario 1
Approx. Time

Conditions Visible in Smokeview

30 seconds
36 seconds

Estimated Detection / Notification time
Smoke descends to the top of the 2nd floor rear exit door.
Visibility near the top of the exit door at about 12 meters
Smoke reaches west (opposite) wall and starts to flow downward
from momentum
Estimated completion of pre-movement time.
Upper half of 2nd floor rear exit stairs have visibility <10 meters
at 6 feet above steps
Smoke reaches north wall and starts to bank down.

50 seconds

60 seconds
64 seconds
68 seconds

71 seconds
82 seconds
85 seconds
90 seconds
98 seconds
100 seconds

110 seconds
125seconds

1st sprinkler activates directly overhead burning chairs.
Momentum of smoke flow across theater slows.
Heat flux adjacent to the fire at the upper portion of the south
aisle to fixed seating exceeds 2.5 kw/m2
Smoke descends to 6 foot height at the north exit door of main
theater. Visibility about 20 meters
Smoke at north theater door risen to about 8 feet above floor but
smoke is thick at 6 feet above floor in NE corner of theater
Visibility on the upper level, north end of the fixed seating
platform is < 10 meters
Visibility for the entire north aisle of fixed seating at 6 foot height
is 10 meters or less.
Visibility around the bar area of the lounge is below 10 meters.
2nd sprinkler head activates on next branch line up towards roof
peak
East half of double exit doors at south end of theater are
immersed smoke with visibility < 10 meters. Smoke down to
about 6 feet above floor.
Entire aisle at south end fixed seating has <10 meters visibility at
6 feet above floor.
Much of area at south of theater has visibility <10 meters.
Temperature at the 2nd floor rear exit about 60 °C. Onset of pain
or burns from moist air possible.
Visibility in smoke at upper reaches of fixed seating near south
end around 10 meters or less at 6 feet above floor
The south doorway to the theater has visibility of only about 2
meters.
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140 seconds
155 seconds
158 seconds
165 seconds

195 seconds
220 seconds
300 seconds

3rd sprinkler head activates. Head next one north on easternmost
branch line
Visibility at the base of the upper fixed seating near the south end
is < 2 meters
4th sprinkler head opens in the center of the ceiling bay between
first two trusses
Southeastern portion of fixed seating has visibility well below
10 meters.
Visibility south of platform/stage < 10 meters, 6 feet above the
base floor level.
5th head opens on second branch line adjacent to south side of the
2nd truss.
The entire southern half of the main theater has visibility < 10
meters 6 feet above floor
Visibility still > 10 meters at north exit, 6 feet above floor.
Temperatures in south aisle of fixed seating and throughout main
body of room 6 feet above the floor remain < 40° C throughout
the theater except in the fire. CO levels < 100 ppm.

Table 6: Fire Timeline for Scenario 1, fire in stacked chairs in main theater south of
fixed seating
	
  
Visibility at the southern exit door fell to below the 10-meter tenability limit at
about 2 minutes after the start of the fire. Visibility for the entire southern half of the
theater fell below this limit in about 220 seconds. Visibility at the northern exit door was
still above 10 meters until 280 seconds into the simulation. At that point, egress was
limited to a single exit, which would necessitate a longer required egress time.
Occupants throughout the theater other than in the immediate vicinity of the fire would
not have reached untenable limits for temperature, heat flux or carbon monoxide
exposure during the 5-minute simulation.
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The evaluation of Scenario 1 in terms of ASET vs. RSET shows that while many
occupants would be able to evacuate from the theater, there was no safety factor for the
time needed for a complete evacuation. RSET exceeded ASET because of deteriorating
visibility.
There is uncertainty in a few variables in Scenario 1 including the fire’s growth
rate as well as the estimated detection and pre-movement times. There is also a question
as to whether the FDS simulation accurately modeled whether the flammable ceiling
finish throughout the main theater space would have ignited. Depending on the actual
flammability of that finish, it is possible that the ceiling may ignite causing fire to sweep
across the underside of the ceiling trapping some occupants inside in a cloud of burning,
falling debris.

Temperature at the ceiling directly above the fire is estimated to have

peaked at 200 °C at 100 seconds after ignition. Burning brands carried aloft to the ceiling
are possible but could not be modeled.
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Figure 52: Visibility vs. Time, Scenario 1
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Figure 53: ASET vs RSET graph for main theater occupants in Scenario 1
Second

floor

occupants

were

presumed

to

have

required

longer

detection/notification and pre-movement times. Because of the lack of a coordinated
detection network throughout the building, a fire in the main theater may not have been
noticed on the second floor until smoke was circulated through the HVAC system (for
which the air return is located above the second floor spaces) to the second floor. The
extent of that circulation is unknown.
The rear exit to the second floor would have been rendered impassable by smoke
within one minute of ignition. It seems doubtful that anyone on the second floor would
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even have noticed the fire by that time. Detection notification times there may have
taken several minutes, however an exact time is likely dependent upon the state of the
HVAC system at the time as well as natural leakage between the spaces. Pre-movement
times would likely take another one to two minutes in the ensuing confusion. If second
floor occupants opened the rear exit door to investigate, an initial flow of hot smoke
through the door would have occurred.
Fortunately, most productions in the main theater take place after hours and on
weekends when the second floor occupancies levels are minimal. Travel times of 100%
of the second floor occupants through the front exit stairs is estimated at 5.1 minutes.
That coupled with detection/notification times along with pre-movement times suggests
evacuation of the second floor may take on the order of 10 minutes or more. Quick
thinking occupants of the second floor who open windows at the front of the building to
allow descending smoke to flow out may extend their available egress time.
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Scenario 2
A 100 kW peak HRR fire with a 30 second growth rate, similar in size and growth
to a trash can fire, starts on one of two upholstered sofas in the lounge area at the north of
the main theater. The fire impinges upon the upper back seating portion of the sofa. FDS
calculates the initial sprinkler head activation at around 80 seconds. The grid size used
was again between 0.2 m and 0.22 m on a side. It was assumed that both exit doors
would be opened about 30 seconds after ignition and remain open for the entire fire
simulation.

Figure 54: HRR Curve from SFPE Handbook for various upholstered furniture items
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Figure 54 was considered in determining an appropriate growth rate for the
scenario. The growth of the scenario was based upon the assumption that established
burning would occur at time = 0. Though such an assumption might be overly aggressive
in light of the variety of ignition sources that might start more slowly, the fire represents
a worst-case condition.
A graph of the heat release rate calculated by the model shows that unlike in
scenario 1, this fire continued to grow in size even after activation of the first sprinkler.
This is in part due to the fact that the first sprinkler to activate is located “upslope” from
the fire plume. The second sprinkler head that activates is actually “downslope” and
closer to the outer wall, some 20 feet away. Neither of these sprinklers appears to have
provided the typical control that might be expected of a fire under or near a sprinkler
head. This type of situation with sloped ceilings is discussed in NFPA 13 in Section
11.2.3.2.4 and calls for a 30% increase in sprinkler coverage if the ceiling slope exceeds
1 in 6. Sprinkler designers for the Center for the Arts added that extra coverage near the
east and west walls of the building between the outermost branch lines. Even so, the
water from the sprinkler did not appear to limit this fire’s growth to the heat release rate
level at the time of sprinkler activation.
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HRR of Sofa in Lounge of Main
Theater	
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Figure 55: Scenario 1 HRR. Sprinkler activation occurs at about 69 seconds

It is assumed like with scenarios 1 and 3, the fire occurs during a theatrical
production and that lights are dimmed and sound is possibly elevated. During such times,
the lounge area north of the fixed seating typically is empty of patrons. Because of this,
the time to fire detection and notification will likely be somewhat extended unless light
from flames catches someone’s attention. Otherwise, the detection and notification time
is estimated at about one minute. Pre-movement time is again estimated at an additional
30 seconds. It is unlikely that visitors would confuse a fire in the lounge area as being
part of a theatrical production.
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Figure 56: View from north shortly after 1st sprinkler activation at 80 seconds

This view from the north of the theater to the area of fire origin clearly shows
activation of the first sprinkler head several feet laterally removed from the smoke plume.
It also shows the plume leaning over somewhat to the east away from the open sprinkler
head.
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Figure 57: View from south even before 1st sprinkler activation showing second floor
exit immersed in smoke and untenable visibility conditions
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Figure 58: View from north shortly after 3rd sprinkler activation at 107 seconds
As shown in Figure 58, three sprinkler heads activate in just under two minutes
yet none of them is directly above the seat of the fire in this instance. This certainly
limits outward flame spread but has little extinguishing effect on the original fire.

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

129

Figure 59: View from north shows visibility < 10m at north door 6 feet above the floor

By 157 seconds, the visibility 6 feet above the floor at the north exit door has
fallen well below 10 meters making visibility conditions untenable at that door.
Elsewhere in the southern portion of the theater, visibility is still adequate for egress.
This causes the overall movement time for complete evacuation to increase to somewhere
between 2.6 and 3.3 minutes calculated in Appendix A.
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Figure 60: View from south. Visibility at 6 feet height by the exit door < 10 m

By 275 seconds, occupants are subject to untenable visibility conditions 6 feet
above the floor at the south exit door. Smoke has caused visibility to fall well below 10
meters.
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Figure 61: View from north. Temperatures are below 60 °C at 6 foot height throughout

By the end of the simulation, temperatures 6 feet above the floor remain below
even the 60 °C level of untenability throughout the theater. Temperatures at the rear exit
to the second floor passed this point at about 90 seconds into the fire shortly after that
area was already rendered untenable by low visibility.
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Fire Timeline – Scenario 2
Approx. Time

Conditions Visible in Smokeview

50 seconds

Visibility untenable at 2nd floor rear exit door
Estimated Detection & Notification time
Smoke at 6 feet above the south aisle of fixed seating temporarily
drops to < 10 meters
Smoke in upper rows at southern part of fixed seating temporarily
drops the visibility to < 10 meters
1st sprinkler head activates.
Visibility 6 feet above top level of fixed seating < 10 meters
Estimated pre-movement time complete.
Temperature untenable at 2nd floor rear exit door
Smoke at south end of fixed seating rises and visibility > 10
meters
2nd sprinkler head activates at lowest branch line to east
3rd sprinkler head activates closer to roof peak, further from fire
plume
Visibility untenable at north exit, 6 feet above the floor
Visibility untenable at south exit, 6 feet above the floor
Temperatures at 6 feet above floor throughout the theater remain
below 60 °C

60 seconds
65 seconds
69 seconds
80 seconds
81 seconds
90 seconds
99 seconds
105 seconds
107 seconds

158 seconds
230 seconds
300 seconds

Table 7: Fire Timeline for Scenario 2, fire in sofa in lounge area of main theater
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Figure 62: Visibility vs. Time, Scenario 2
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Figure 63: ASET vs RSET graph for main theater occupants in Scenario 2

The ASET vs. RSET graph for Scenario 2 shows that the required safe egress
time from the main theater would be expected to be on the order of 4 to 4.5 minutes. The
difference between the two is dependent upon whether or not some of the people could
evacuate through the north exit door prior to visibility there becoming untenable at 158
seconds. If so, then it’s possible the ASET is sufficient since visibility at the south exit
door is generally adequate until about 230 seconds after the fire start. Temperature, heat
flux and carbon monoxide exposures remained tenable throughout the entire period. If
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the detection/notification and pre-movement times can be shortened by about a minute
than those estimated here, the likelihood of a successful evacuation improves. If the
flammable ceiling finish becomes involved in fire and upper level flames spread
throughout the theater, the chances of injuries or fatalities increase. Regardless, even
though this fire is relatively small in size, this scenario again shows there is little chance
of a complete evacuation of the main theater even with sprinkler activation unless early
notification occurs.
As with Scenario 1, egress of occupants of the front lobby areas and art gallery
along with those in the second floor spaces was not studied. Even though the fire in this
scenario starts at the north end of the theater opposite these spaces, rapid smoke filling
throughout the theater makes the second floor rear exit unusable in less than a minute,
very similarly to a fire burning at the south end of the theater adjacent to these spaces.
Successful evacuation of the second floor will again rely on 100% evacuation through the
front exit door. Second floor evacuation times are again estimated at up to ten minutes
depending on the number of people there at the time.
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Scenario 3
The third fire scenario occurs on the platform/stage. Two large gymnasium-type
mats kept there are presumed to ignite and burn, possibly started by a malfunction in
nearby electrical equipment. A peak heat release rate of 2,000 kW was chosen with an
ultra-fast growth rate. Testing conducted several years ago in full-scale fire tests by
Professor Mowrer to examine the fire growth of gymnasium mats were considered in
estimating this fire curve. It was concluded that sprinkler activation would likely follow
not long after ignition because of the relatively close distance between the top of the mat
and the sprinkler.

Reducing the growth rate in the model to provide for a slower fire

development would significantly increase calculation time and likely not add
substantially to the understanding of smoke layer development and spread or the response
by the automatic sprinkler system. It might provide a more conservative estimate of the
ASET. A similar mesh size of between 0.2 m and 0.22 m like those for scenarios 1 and
2 was again used.
Figure 54 (shown above on page 124) was again used to determine an appropriate
growth rate for this scenario since the major mass of the gym mat is polyurethane foam.
The growth of the scenario was once again based upon the assumption that established
burning would start at the very onset of the scenario. Though such an assumption might
be overly aggressive in light of the variety of ignition sources that might start more
slowly, the fire represents a worst-case condition and minimizes unnecessary model
calculation time.
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Figure 64: Heat release rate for scenario 3. Sprinkler activation occurs at about 73
seconds.
The estimated growth rate of the fire seemed reasonable in comparison to actual
testing. Though there was the potential for a much higher peak heat release rate without
sprinklers, the peak rate in the model was consistent with a sprinkler activation that
controlled the fire growth but did not extinguish the blaze.
Detection and notification times were estimated to be on the order of 60 seconds.
It would be expected to be less if the platform/stage was occupied at the time. The gym
mat is generally not observable by the audience. If the platform/stage was occupied as in
a performance, back-stage actors and stagehands would be expected to notice the fire and
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give directions to visitors. This would reduce pre-movement time to approximately 45
seconds. As with Scenarios 1 and 2, movement time for evacuation of the main theater is
estimated at between 2.6 or 2.75 minutes when both exit doors are accessible to 3.3
minutes for only one door. In this scenario, both doors should have remained accessible
for equal periods of time. Both exit doors are assumed to be opened about 30 seconds
after ignition and to remain open for the entire fire simulation.

Figure 65: View of west side of main theater. Gym mats shown to left with green top.
The white space to the right of the mat depicts the rear side of the theater screen.
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Figure 65 is the Smokeview output of the layout of Scenario 3 in the main theater.
The graphic depicts the theater prior to ignition. As before, wall sections have been
rendered invisible for ease of viewing. The blue sections represent the curtains on the
platform/stage. Structural elements are generally depicted in white.

Figure 66: View from west of main theater shortly after 1st sprinkler activation at 75
seconds
The first sprinkler activates at about 73 seconds after the fire start. The estimated
HRR at the time is about 2,000 kW. Smoke levels have already enveloped the rear exit
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door from the second floor and have descended approximately one-third the depth from
floor to ceiling.

Figure 67: View from southwest shortly after 1st sprinkler activation at 75 seconds
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Figure 68: View from southeast after 4th sprinkler activation at 95 seconds
Because of the intensity of the fire and the elevated position of the gym mats in
relation to the sprinklers, four sprinkler heads activate within 22 seconds of each other.
By the time the 4th head activates, smoke levels descend below a level 6 feet above the
upper fixed seating platform.

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

142

Figure 69: Visibility slice at the southern aisle of the seating platform at 110 seconds.
By 110 seconds, the visibility at 6 feet above the upper platform in the fixed
seating is well below 10 meters.

Overall smoke layer stability is nearly uniform

throughout the main theater and still descending.
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Figure 70: View from north at 180 seconds. Visibility 6 feet above the floor < 10 meters
By 180 seconds into the fire, at least five sprinklers have activated including one
at the peak of the roof, approximately 35 feet laterally distant from the main fire. The
number of activations not only tax the sprinkler system’s ability to control the fire by
adding increased water demand but they also cool the smoke sufficiently to drop
visibility levels at 6 feet above the theater floor to less than 10 meters.
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Figure 71: Visibility slice shown from the northeast at 240 seconds. Visibility at 3 feet
above the floor < 10 meters
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Figure 72: Chart of sprinkler element temperature vs. time showing activations for
Scenario 3

The magnitude of the gym mat fire revels that in addition to creating untenable
conditions for occupants in terms of visibility, it also severely challenges the sprinkler
system. By four minutes into the fire, at least eight sprinkler heads activate. The
sprinkler system was designed to fully operate with up to five heads activating.
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Figure 73: View of gas temperatures at 270 seconds into the fire

Throughout the fire, though smoke levels drop close to the floor, temperature
exposures at a level 6 feet above the highest seating level do not reach above 60 °C.
Although the fire conditions become untenable in terms of visibility, they do not become
untenable due to temperature exposure.
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Fire Timeline – Scenario 3
Approx. Time

Conditions Visible on Smokeview

48 seconds
60 seconds
64 seconds

Visibility < 10 meters at 2nd floor rear exit
Estimated Detection / Notification time
Smoke reaches east side of theater
Visibility near zero at base of 2nd floor rear exit upper landing
1st sprinkler head activates above fire
2nd and 3rd sprinkler heads activate
4th sprinkler head activates
5th sprinkler head activates
Visibility < 10 meters at north end, top of fixed seating
Estimated completion of pre-movement time
Visibility < 10 meters at south end, top of fixed seating
6th sprinkler head activates
7th sprinkler head activates
Visibility < 10 meters throughout theater at about 6 feet above
floor
8th sprinkler head activates
Visibility < 10 meters throughout theater; rolls out north door
Visibility < 10 meters throughout theater; rolls out south door

68 seconds
73 seconds
84 seconds
84.3 seconds
95 seconds
96 seconds
105 seconds
110 seconds
155 seconds

200 seconds
205 seconds
230 seconds
240 seconds

Table 8: Fire Timeline for Scenario 3, fire in gym mat on main theater platform/stage
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Figure 74: Visibility vs. Time, Scenario 3
The visibility at 6 feet above the floor at the south doors, north doors and stage
temporarily drops to below the 10-meter tenability limit at about 50 seconds at the south
and 170 seconds at the north and stage. These are short-lived instances however and the
visibility quickly raises to tenable levels. Not until around 200 seconds does the visibility
at all three areas become untenable for an extended period of time.

Accordingly, the

ASET based upon visibility was estimated at 200 seconds after ignition. It should be
noted that in this instance, as in Scenarios 1 and 2, the visibility at the second floor rear
exit becomes untenable in less than a minute.
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Figure 75: ASET vs RSET graph for main theater occupants in Scenario 3
As seen by the ASET vs. RSET graph for Scenario 3, though the required safe
egress time from the main theater would be expected to be on the order of 4.5 minutes,
visibility of more than 10 meters at a point 6 feet above the floor lasted slightly more than
3 minutes. Temperature, heat flux and carbon monoxide exposures remained well below
the tenability limits throughout the entire period. The maximum temperature outside the
immediate fire area at 6 feet above the floor was about 40 °C. Maximum CO levels again
reached only about 100 ppm, 10 times less than untenable conditions.
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Once again like in the first two scenarios, only the egress of occupants from the
main theater was examined. And like with the first two scenarios, the second floor rear
exit became untenable in less than a minute. The uncertainty in the detection/notification
times on the second floor is high. The available safe egress time from the second floor is
unknown and a matter of speculation. What is likely however is that the required safe
egress time using conservative estimates of detection/notification and pre-movement
times is on the order of 10 minutes after ignition depending on the occupancy load of the
second floor at the time of the fire.
In order to improve the ASET vs. RSET conditions for Scenario 3, the
detection/notification and pre-movement times must be decreased. Even if they were
decreased to on the order of 30 seconds, a full safe evacuation of the maximum
occupancy load of the theater even with sprinkler activations is questionable. If the
estimated fire growth rate used in the model is faster than an actual fire would grow,
some time cushion would result.

If actual sprinkler activations followed the pattern

revealed in the model, then its possible that the entire system might be overwhelmed.
Residual water supply pressure and supply may be sufficient to handle the additional load
but a new hydraulic calculation should be performed to verify that.

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

151

Scenario 4
Scenario 4 involves a fire in the rear theater. It starts behind the rear row of
audience seats at the top of platform, adjacent to the production control booth. The
movable seats used in the rear theater consist of a metal frame and a wooden seat
cushioned with polyurethane foam padding and covered with a synthetic fabric.
Numerous electrical power lines run in and around the control booth to operate the
lighting and sound inside the theater. While a specific failure mode to cause this fire was
not identified, an accidental ignition by one of these power sources was presumed.
Fire modeling was conducted based on a fire growth curve of an initial fuel with a
400 kW peak in 60 seconds. The fire spreads to other fuels including chairs in the area of
origin before the sprinkler system activates. Material properties selected for the chairs
are the same as those selected for similar chairs stacked in the main theater in scenario 1.
The initial fire was designed to start decaying after 60 seconds.
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Figure 76: HRR Curve from SFPE Handbook for stacked wood pallets
Figure 76 was considered in estimating an appropriate growth rate for the
scenario.

The fire started under the chairs on the rear side of the platform and would

initially involve openly configured, vertical and horizontal wood members. The growth
of the scenario was based upon two assumptions. The first was that established burning
would occur at time = 0 and the second was the involvement of the fire on the wooden
items would be at a rate consistent with Figure 76. The peak heat release rate was based
upon estimations of the amount of wood that would be burning as well as upholstered
cushions on the chairs by the time of sprinkler activation.
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This scenario again assumes that the fire occurs during a theatrical production and
that lights are dimmed and sound is possibly elevated. Because of the relatively small
size of the theater and the location of the fire near the audience, detection and notification
times would likely be on the order of 30 seconds or less if the platform/stage is occupied
at the time. The first audience members to notice the fire would be expected to notify
others and begin moving. Pre-movement time is estimated at 30 seconds after
notification. Since a smoke detector is mounted in the normally open sprinkler control
room at the rear of the theater, it is expected that detector would sound within one minute
of the onset of the fire and activate the horn-strobe notification device. Additionally,
once a sprinkler head opens, the outside vibrating bell will sound.
Movement time for evacuation of the rear theater is estimated at 1.5 minutes.
People in the rear lobby at the time of the fire would be notified by the horn strobe
sounding or when actors or theater personnel in the dressing rooms move to the lobby
door to evacuate. The main exit door to the theater is assumed to be opened 20 seconds
after the start of the fire and to remain open. The sprinkler control room door and the
rear lobby exit door are assumed to be opened at 60 seconds after ignition and to remain
open.
Unlike the fires in the three main theater scenarios, this fire decays almost as
quickly as it grows. Any ignition of the chairs is quickly controlled and extinguished in
part due to the closer proximity of the low sprinkler heads in this theater as compared to
those in the main theater.
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Figure 77: Heat release rate for scenario 3. Sprinkler activation occurs at about 73
seconds.
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Figure 78: View of rear wing from northwest. West wall made invisible for viewing.
Seating on the seating platform is shown in olive green.
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Figure 79: Close-up view of the rear theater 30 seconds after ignition. Detection by
occupants presumed to happen by this time.

By 30 seconds after ignition, an established smoke plume likely would alert
occupants in the seating area as well as theater personnel in the control booth
immediately behind the seating.

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

157

Figure 80: Sprinkler head activates above control room at 73 seconds
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Figure 81: By 87 seconds visibility throughout seating area is untenable
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Figure 82: Wider view of rear theater at 87 seconds. Smoke has reached the sprinkler
room.
By 87 seconds after ignition, the smoke level had enveloped much of the seating
area and has flowed into the sprinkler room. The smoke detector there would have
activated by this time alerting people outside the building of a fire within.
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Figure 83: Visibility slice file 6 feet above floor showing untenable conditions in blue

Though the platform/stage area still has adequate visibility a minute and a half
after ignition, the rear seating area is mostly enveloped in smoke causing visibility to
drop to below untenable conditions. If the doorway behind the platform/stage is clearly
marked and visible with open access, some patrons will likely move towards it and into
the sprinkler room exiting through its door into the parking lot.
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Figure 84: Vertical slice at 101 sec. The stage is to the left and seating to the right.
Visibility about 6 feet above floor is less than 10 meters.

By 101 seconds, the visibility throughout the rear theater at 6 feet above the floor
is reduced to untenable conditions. The fire size has decays to around 200 kW, that of a
moderate trash can fire.
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Figure 85: Maximum temperatures of about 30 °C reached at 6 feet above floor outside
of fire plume

Though visibility conditions from even a small fire such as this worsened rapidly
and became untenable within a minute and a half, temperatures in the theater remained
moderate. This slice shows temperatures at 6 feet above the floor at their near-maximum
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levels in the fire.

Subsequently, as the fire decays, temperatures quickly drop.

Maximum CO levels of about 140 ppm occur at 200 seconds and thereafter drop. At
about the time the sprinkler activates, heat fluxes reach approximately 3 kW/m2 at the
backs of the second row of chairs from the top row as the fire grows under the rear seats.
Thereafter it drops to well below the untenable limit of 2.5 kW/m2. Heat fluxes outside
the area of actual fire also remain low.

Fire Timeline – Scenario 4
Approx.
Time

Conditions Visible on Smokeview

30 seconds
60 seconds
73 seconds
75 seconds

Estimated Detection and Notification time
Estimated completion of pre-movement time
1st sprinkler head activates above fire
The bottom of the smoke layer had descended to about 6 feet above
top level of seating platform
87 seconds
Visibility is untenable at 6 feet above the eastern 2/3 of seating
platform
Visibility
is
untenable
at
6
feet
above the floor throughout the
101 seconds
theater
120 seconds
Peak temperatures of about 30 °C at 6 feet above the floor

Table 9: Fire Timeline for Scenario 3, fire in gym mat on main theater platform/stage
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Figure 86: ASET vs RSET graph for rear theater occupants in Scenario 4
The ASET vs RSET graph for Scenario 4 clearly demonstrates that with even a
small fire controlled by sprinkler activation, occupants of the rear theater would be
exposed to untenable visibility conditions before a full evacuation could be expected.
By 101 seconds, visibility at six feet above the floor is less than 10 meters throughout the
theater. At this time, visibility near the floor would be adequate but would require
evacuees to bend down below normal standing height or crawl from the theater.
Fortunately, temperatures in this scenario at 6 feet above the floor and below never peak
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much above about 30 °C except in the fire plume reducing thermal exposure from such a
small fire controlled by sprinkler activation.
Even so, this scenario clearly demonstrates the need for alternate exits out of the
rear theater in accordance with the remoteness requirements contained in Sections
7.5.1.3.1 and 7.5.1.3.2 of the Life Safety Code.

They state in part that multiple,

accessible exits must be located no closer to each other than one half the diagonal
measurement of a room. For the rear theater, that minimum separation distance between
exits is on the order of 28 feet.
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Comments and Recommendations
The prescriptive and performance-based analyses of the Center for the Arts
building identified various factors related to both major and minor fire safety issues that
might affect the life safety of the building occupants.

Computer fire modeling

simulations showed that with regards to four design fire scenarios created to examine
ASET vs. RSET, that even with an automatic sprinkler suppression system activating,
maximum occupancy loads face significant hurdles in achieving safe egress and that
incomplete evacuations are likely.
Possible corrective measures are discussed below that could either decrease the
required time needed for safe egress allowing for a greater margin of safety or increase
the available safe egress time.

Some are relatively easy to accomplish while others may

require more intense and perhaps costly efforts.
History has shown that when fires occur in buildings with similar, unaddressed
issues, large losses of life and numerous injuries to occupants can result.

Two notable

examples of fires that led to tremendous loss of life in the past 40 years were the Station
Nightclub fire in 2003 in which 100 people died and more than 200 more were injured
and the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in 1977 that resulted in 164 deaths and more than
200 injuries.
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Alarm System
The	
   Center	
   for	
   the	
   Arts	
   is	
   not	
   required	
   by	
   code	
   to	
   have	
   an	
   alarm	
   system	
  
besides	
   that	
   installed	
   in	
   the	
   sprinkler	
   control	
   room.	
   	
   Even	
   so,	
   the	
   performance-‐
based	
   analyses	
   presented	
   herein	
   have	
   shown	
   the	
   benefit	
   of	
   modification	
   and	
  
extension	
   of	
   the	
   existing	
   system.	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   NFPA	
   72	
   states	
   that,	
   “Fire	
   alarm	
   systems	
  
intended	
   for	
   life	
   safety	
   should	
   be	
   designed,	
   installed,	
   and	
   maintained	
   to	
   provide	
  
indication	
   and	
   warning	
   of	
   abnormal	
   fire	
   conditions.	
   The	
   system	
   should	
   alert	
  
building	
   occupants	
   and	
   summon	
   appropriate	
   aid	
   in	
   adequate	
   time	
   to	
   allow	
   for	
  
occupants	
   to	
   travel	
   to	
   a	
   safe	
   place	
   and	
   for	
   rescue	
   operations	
   to	
   occur.	
   The	
   fire	
  
alarm	
  system	
  should	
  be	
  part	
  of	
  a	
  life	
  safety	
  plan	
  that	
  also	
  includes	
  a	
  combination	
  of	
  
prevention,	
  protection,	
  egress,	
  and	
  other	
  features	
  particular	
  to	
  that	
  occupancy.”	
  
The	
  Life	
  Safety	
  Code	
  sets	
  forth	
  as	
  one	
  of	
  its	
  principal	
  objectives,	
  the	
  idea	
  of	
  
occupant	
  protection.	
  	
  In	
  it	
  is	
  states,	
  “A	
  structure	
  shall	
  be	
  designed,	
  constructed,	
  and	
  
maintained	
   to	
   protect	
   occupants	
   who	
   are	
   not	
   intimate	
   with	
   the	
   initial	
   fire	
  
development	
  for	
  the	
  time	
  needed	
  to	
  evacuate,	
  relocate,	
  or	
  defend	
  in	
  place.”	
  	
  Many	
  of	
  
the	
  occupants	
  of	
  the	
  Center	
  for	
  the	
  Arts	
  are	
  expected	
  to	
  be	
  first	
  time	
  or	
  occasional	
  
visitors	
   not	
   totally	
   familiar	
   with	
   the	
   building	
   and	
   its	
   system	
   and	
   layout.	
  	
  	
  	
  
Accordingly,	
  the	
  above	
  objective	
  contained	
  in	
  the	
  LSC	
  seems	
  particularly	
  applicable	
  
to	
  the	
  Center	
  for	
  the	
  Arts.	
  
The	
   water	
   flow	
   alarm	
   for	
   the	
   sprinkler	
   system	
   is	
   connected	
   to	
   only	
   two	
  
notification	
  appliances,	
  a	
  horn/strobe	
  	
  mounted	
  	
  in	
  	
  the	
  	
  rear	
  	
  theater	
  adjacent	
  to	
  
Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

168

the	
  sprinkler	
  room	
  and	
  a	
  vibrating	
  bell	
  mounted	
  on	
  the	
  exterior,	
  north	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  
building,	
  also	
  adjacent	
  to	
  the	
  sprinkler	
  room.	
  According	
  to	
  the	
  building	
  staff,	
  even	
  if	
  
either	
  of	
  those	
  notification	
  appliances	
  should	
  activate,	
  they	
  may	
  not	
  be	
  heard	
  under	
  
normal	
   circumstances	
   in	
   the	
   main	
   part	
   of	
   the	
   building	
   that	
   includes	
   the	
   main	
  
theater,	
  the	
  front	
  lobby	
  and	
  offices	
  or	
  in	
  the	
  second	
  floor	
  spaces.	
  
During	
   a	
   performance	
   in	
   the	
   main	
   theater,	
   attendees	
   there	
   might	
   never	
   hear	
  
the	
   notification	
   appliances	
   sounding	
   because	
   of	
   the	
   sound	
   levels	
   from	
   ongoing	
  
presentation.	
   	
   	
   The	
   potential	
   evacuation	
   delays	
   could	
   have	
   deadly	
   consequences.	
  
Attendees	
  would	
  likely	
  be	
  delayed	
  in	
  starting	
  their	
  departure	
  making	
  a	
  safe,	
  timely	
  
and	
  full	
  evacuation	
  even	
  more	
  difficult	
  to	
  achieve.	
  
Modifications	
   and	
   additions	
   to	
   the	
   existing	
   alarm	
   system	
   could	
   greatly	
  
enhance	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  theater	
  occupants	
  from	
  such	
  an	
  event.	
  	
  First	
  and	
  relatively	
  
easily,	
   the	
   existing	
   notification	
   appliance	
   system	
   for	
   the	
   waterflow	
   alarm	
   could	
   be	
  
extended	
   to	
   the	
   main	
   theater,	
   front	
   lobby	
   and	
   the	
   second	
   floor	
   occupancies.	
   	
   This	
  
simple	
   improvement	
   would	
   reduce	
   detection/notification	
   and	
   probably	
   pre-‐
movement	
   times	
   significantly.	
   	
   Further,	
   commercially	
   available	
   devices	
   could	
   link	
  
the	
  alarm	
  system	
  with	
  the	
  theater’s	
  sound	
  and	
  lighting	
  systems.	
  	
  	
  In	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  a	
  
fire	
   during	
   a	
   performance,	
   theatrical	
   sound	
   levels	
   would	
   be	
   automatically	
   reduced	
  
to	
  allow	
  fire	
  notification	
  appliances	
  to	
  be	
  heard	
  and	
  lighting	
  levels	
  in	
  the	
  darkened	
  
theater	
   would	
   be	
   raised.	
   	
   Provisions	
   for	
   such	
   systems	
   are	
   discussed	
   in	
   Section	
  
18.4.3.1	
  of	
  NFPA	
  72.	
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Where	
   acceptable	
   to	
   the	
   authority	
   having	
   jurisdiction,	
   reducing	
   the	
  
background	
   noise	
   is	
   a	
   viable	
   alternative	
   to	
   providing	
   a	
   fire	
   alarm	
   notification	
  
system	
  with	
  high	
  level	
  audio	
  output.	
  NFPA	
  72	
  states	
  that	
  in	
  some	
  situations,	
  such	
  
as	
   nightclubs,	
   concert	
   halls,	
   and	
   theaters,	
   an	
   advisable	
   action	
   is	
   to	
   stop	
   the	
  
background	
  noise	
  and	
  control	
  the	
  lighting	
  to	
  create	
  a	
  sudden	
  and	
  noticeable	
  change	
  
in	
   the	
   environment	
   to	
   get	
   people’s	
   attention.	
   	
   This	
   would	
   serve	
   to	
   alert	
   both	
  
visitors	
  and	
  employees.	
  
It	
  is	
  also	
  recommended	
  to	
  extend	
  the	
  smoke	
  detection	
  system	
  to	
  under	
  the	
  
ceiling	
   in	
   the	
   main	
   theater	
   to	
   provide	
   additional	
   notification	
   time	
   to	
   occupants.	
  	
  
While	
  detection	
  throughout	
  the	
  theater	
  is	
  recommended,	
  even	
  a	
  line	
  of	
  detectors	
  at	
  
the	
   top	
   of	
   the	
   arched	
   ceiling	
   would	
   be	
   a	
   significant	
   improvement.	
   	
   In	
   the	
  
performance-‐based	
  scenarios,	
  the	
  time	
  to	
  detection	
  was	
  wholly	
  based	
  on	
  occupant	
  
detection.	
   	
   Although	
   a	
   wet	
   pipe	
   sprinkler	
   system	
   is	
   installed,	
   it	
   is	
   clear	
   that	
   large	
  
amounts	
   of	
   smoke	
   can	
   be	
   produced	
   and	
   spread	
   throughout	
   the	
   theater	
   before	
   a	
  
sprinkler	
   head	
   activates.	
   	
   Any	
   reduction	
   in	
   the	
   time	
   of	
   detection	
   and	
   notification	
  
adds	
  a	
  safety	
  margin	
  to	
  RSET.	
  	
  	
  
Another	
   alarm	
   system	
   improvement	
   that	
   would	
   minimize	
   smoke	
   flow	
  
throughout	
  the	
  Center	
  for	
  the	
  Arts	
  would	
  be	
  connecting	
  the	
  fire	
  detection	
  system	
  to	
  
the	
  HVAC	
  air	
  movers.	
  	
  Once	
  a	
  detection	
  signal	
  was	
  sensed,	
  power	
  to	
  the	
  fans	
  would	
  
be	
   shut	
   off	
   thus	
   minimizing	
   forced	
   circulation	
   of	
   smoke	
   into	
   the	
   first	
   and	
   second	
  
floor	
  spaces	
  at	
  the	
  front	
  of	
  the	
  building.	
  	
  An	
  air	
  return	
  located	
  near	
  the	
  peak	
  of	
  the	
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south	
   wall	
   of	
   the	
   main	
   theater	
   routes	
   air	
   into	
   cooling	
   equipment	
   located	
   in	
   a	
  
portion	
  of	
  the	
  ceiling/attic	
  space	
  above	
  the	
  second	
  floor.	
  	
  Disabling	
  air	
  movement	
  
through	
  this	
  system	
  during	
  a	
  fire	
  would	
  slow	
  the	
  smoke	
  flow	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  theater	
  to	
  a	
  
rate	
  wholly	
  dependent	
  on	
  leakage	
  rather	
  than	
  forced	
  air	
  flow.	
  
The	
   AHJ	
   previously	
   opined	
   that	
   the	
   Center	
   for	
   the	
   Arts	
   is	
   relieved	
   of	
   the	
  
onus	
   of	
   Section	
   13.3.4.1.1	
   of	
   the	
   Life	
   Safety	
   Code	
   (requiring	
   an	
   alarm	
   system	
   in	
  
existing	
  assembly	
  spaces	
  with	
  occupant	
  loads	
  of	
  more	
  than	
  300)	
  since	
  a	
  sprinkler	
  
system	
   is	
   installed	
   therein.	
   	
   The	
   reasoning	
   was	
   that	
   a	
   sprinkler	
   head	
   can	
   act	
   as	
   a	
  
form	
   of	
   heat	
   detector	
   and	
   serve	
   to	
   alert	
   occupants	
   of	
   fire	
   danger.	
   	
   As	
   the	
  
performance	
  based	
  analyses	
  showed,	
  by	
  the	
  time	
  sprinklers	
  do	
  activate,	
  smoke	
  can	
  
be	
  widespread	
  throughout	
  the	
  main	
  theater	
  and	
  visibility	
  levels	
  quickly	
  dropping.	
  
A	
   series	
   of	
   smoke	
   detectors	
   and	
   notification	
   devices	
   installed	
   in	
   the	
   main	
  
theater	
   would	
   provide	
   earlier	
   alerts	
   to	
   fire	
   there	
   than	
   would	
   the	
   activation	
   of	
   a	
  
sprinkler	
   head.	
   	
   Since	
   the	
   existing	
   sound	
   and	
   visual	
   appliances	
   connected	
   to	
   the	
  
waterflow	
  alarm	
  are	
  located	
  well	
  outside	
  the	
  theater,	
  it	
  should	
  be	
  presumed	
  they	
  
might	
  be	
  completely	
  ineffective	
  in	
  alerting	
  occupants	
  of	
  fire	
  danger.	
  
In	
   addition	
   to	
   adding	
   an	
   alarm	
   system	
   to	
   the	
   main	
   theater,	
   addition	
   of	
  
detection	
   and	
   notification	
   appliances	
   on	
   the	
   second	
   floor	
   should	
   also	
   be	
  
considered.	
   	
   Since	
   the	
   second	
   floor	
   occupancies	
   do	
   not	
   share	
   common	
   areas	
   or	
  
activities	
   with	
   the	
   rest	
   of	
   the	
   building	
   with	
   the	
   exception	
   of	
   HVAC,	
   a	
   fire	
   starting	
  
elsewhere	
  could	
  easily	
  go	
  unnoticed	
  on	
  the	
  second	
  floor	
  for	
  a	
  significant	
  time.	
  	
  That	
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along	
   with	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   one	
   half	
   of	
   the	
   second	
   floor	
   egress	
   capacity	
   passes	
   through	
  
the	
   main	
   theater	
   makes	
   it	
   crucial	
   to	
   provide	
   second	
   floor	
   occupants	
   with	
   early	
  
notification.	
   	
   As	
   is	
   evident	
   with	
   each	
   of	
   the	
   three	
   fire	
   scenarios	
   in	
   the	
   main	
   theater,	
  
the	
  second	
  floor	
  rear	
  exit	
  can	
  become	
  impassable	
  within	
  one	
  minute	
  of	
  fire	
  ignition	
  
at	
  ground	
  level	
  in	
  the	
  theater.	
  
Lastly,	
   though	
   perhaps	
   minor	
   in	
   comparison	
   to	
   the	
   other	
   alarm	
   issues,	
   the	
  
existing	
  smoke	
  detector	
  arrangement	
  in	
  the	
  art	
  gallery	
  is	
  insufficient	
  and	
  does	
  not	
  
meet	
   code	
   requirements	
   with	
   regards	
   to	
   placement.	
   	
   Sections	
   17.5.2	
   and	
   17.5	
   3	
   of	
  
NFPA	
  72,	
  the	
  National	
  Fire	
  Alarm	
  and	
  Signaling	
  Code	
  dictate	
  that	
  smoke	
  detectors	
  
should	
   be	
   mounted	
   within	
   the	
   top	
   15%	
   of	
   the	
   room	
   height.	
   	
   	
   In	
   the	
   art	
   gallery,	
  
that	
   distance	
   is	
   within	
   22.5	
   inches	
   of	
   the	
   ceiling.	
   The	
   existing	
   detector	
   is	
   30	
  
inches	
   below.	
   	
   Even	
   if	
   mounted	
   at	
   the	
   correct	
   height	
   on	
   a	
   wall	
   or	
   on	
   the	
   ceiling,	
  
the	
  existing	
  detector	
  might	
  still	
  not	
  provide	
  adequate	
  smoke	
  detection.	
  	
  The	
  upper	
  
part	
   of	
   the	
   gallery	
   is	
   divided	
   into	
   three	
   bays	
   separated	
   by	
   deep,	
   solid	
   beams.	
   	
   A	
  
single	
  smoke	
  detector	
  will	
  only	
  lead	
  to	
  timely	
  activation	
  if	
  a	
  fire	
  starts	
  directly	
  below	
  
the	
   bay	
   in	
   which	
   the	
   detector	
   is	
   mounted.	
   	
   If	
   it	
   started	
   below	
   another	
   bay,	
   then	
  
smoke	
  would	
  first	
  have	
  to	
  fill	
  that	
  bay	
  and	
  then	
  spill	
  out	
  and	
  flow	
  into	
  the	
  bay	
  with	
  
the	
   detector	
   before	
   activation	
   would	
   be	
   assured.	
   	
   	
   Currently,	
   all	
   three	
   bays	
   will	
  
have	
  to	
  fill	
  with	
  smoke	
  and	
  then	
  the	
  smoke	
  layer	
  will	
  have	
  to	
  descend	
  about	
  six	
  
more	
   inches	
   before	
   reaching	
   the	
   existing	
   detector.	
   	
   	
   Although	
   fire	
   detection	
   is	
   not	
  
required	
   in	
   the	
   art	
   gallery,	
   to	
   make	
   the	
   current	
   system	
   adequate	
   will	
   require	
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repositioning	
  the	
  existing	
  detector	
  higher	
  in	
  the	
  room	
  and	
  addition	
  of	
  at	
  least	
  two	
  
more	
  detectors	
  in	
  the	
  adjacent	
  ceiling	
  bays.	
  	
  
	
  

Horizontal Exit
The performance based scenarios in the main theater all showed that in the event
of a fire there, the rear emergency exit for the second floor becomes unusable within
seconds of the fire’s start. With that exit unavailable, little option is left to those on the
second floor with regards to egress other than full evacuation through the front exit. An
expensive and challenging option to alleviate this problem would be addition of an
additional exit that opened directly from the second floor to the exterior of the building.
Another option would be to separate or isolate the existing second floor rear exit stairs
from the rest of the main theater by enclosing it behind fire rated walls and doors, thus
qualifying it a horizontal exit. Without some modification however, the current rear exit
should be considered as unreliable in the event of a fire starting in the main theater, front
lobby or adjacent spaces. It could still be effective should a fire start in the second floor
spaces.
The wall separating the main theater from the first and second floors to the south
could serve as a horizontal exit into the front lobby with some modifications. The doors
between the lobby and theater would have to be upgraded to fire rated doors limiting
smoke flow through ample leakage paths around the existing door.

Additionally,

penetrations through the wall from piping or ducting would also have to be filled or
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enclosed to prevent smoke and fire migration through the wall. HVAC ducts extending
between the first and second floors could be enclosed in chases surrounded by fire
resistant rated walls.

Administrative Controls - Storage
Two of the fire scenarios examined for the performance based analyses involved
stored items as the main fuel source. Stacked chairs, either upholstered or plastic and the
gym mats on the platform/stage can result in fires with readily high heat release rates that
would not only lead to rapid fire spread, but which could overwhelm the existing
sprinkler system. Prompt consideration should be given to eliminating the chair storage
from alongside the south edge of the theater’s fixed seating and relocating it to enclosed
storage areas such as at the north end of the theater. Though the fire danger from the sum
of the chairs when unstacked is relatively insignificant, once stacked, the geometry of the
stacks makes them a serious fire danger to occupants. If ignited, even sprinkler activation
may prove ineffective at fire control since many of the chairs’ burning surfaces may be
shielded from falling droplets. Further, a fire in a stacked arrangement tends to generate
significantly more toxic smoke than if the same number of chairs burned separately.
The gym mat on the platform stage also poses a serious fire danger if ignited. As
shown in Scenario 3, the mass of foam in the mat has enough energy to overwhelm the
theater’s sprinkler system in minutes.

If alternative storage is unavailable due to the

size of the mats, then they should at least be enclosed under fire resistant materials or
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protected from the possibility of ignition from failures in nearby, overhead electrical
circuits and equipment. The current location of the mat openly exposed to potential
ignition sources poses an unnecessary risk.

Interior Finish
Ceilings throughout most of the Center for the Arts, on both the first and second
floors, are lined with insulation with the facing exposed. That facing has been shown to
easily ignite with a small flame.

Section 13.3.3.3 of the LSC requires that in existing

buildings with general assembly areas having occupant loads of more than 300, interior
wall and ceiling finish materials shall be rated Class A or Class B as determined by
standardized testing. No records of applicable testing or flammability ratings of the
material are known to exist. Unofficial flammability tests that exposed the material to
small flames suggests the ceiling finish will likely not meet existing Class A or B
requirements.
A documentation review for similar products for sale by major insulation
suppliers suggests most analogous materials do not meet the interior finish rating
requirements set forth in the Life Safety Code for existing occupancies. One need only
review the results of major fire catastrophes such as the Station Nightclub Fire, the
Beverly Hills Supper Club and others in which the contribution of flammable interior
finish led to multiple fatalities to realize the significance of this issue. If ignited, flame
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spread over the exposed ceiling facing would be rapid.

Such a fire could quickly

overwhelm the sprinkler system and rain flaming debris down onto the occupants below.
Reducing thus fire danger will likely require that the material either be removed,
covered or treated. It could be protected from fire exposure from below by covering it
with gypsum board or another material with low-combustibility or Class B finish ratings.
There might also be approved fire resistant coatings that could be used to cover the
facing.

Rear Theater Exits
The existing arrangement of exits in the rear theater does not appear to meet the
requirements of the Life Safety Code in terms of exit arrangement or visibility of exits.
At present, most occupants to the rear theater would likely attempt to evacuate through
the main exit in the event of a fire. Though a second exit behind the platform/stage that
leads into and through the sprinkler control room has been thought by Center staff to be
a satisfactory alternative, it is neither visible from the main part of the theater nor is it
clearly marked and accessible. The AHJ should be consulted with regards to available
alternatives. At a minimum, the secondary exit must be clearly visible from throughout
the space and access to it unimpeded.

Whether that would be an acceptable alternate

exit based upon its required egress travel through the sprinkler control room is a matter to
be decided by the AHJ.
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Appendix A
Egress - Occupancy Load Determinations

The following four pages show maximum occupancy load spreadsheet
calculations for the Center for the Arts building that are based upon the occupancy
loading criteria of Table 7.3.1.2 of the Life Safety Code.
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Hand Calculations Of Estimated Movement and
Required Safe Egress Times (RSET)
Art Gallery
Exit Discharge Door
Door to Lobby
Maximum occupancy
Maximum Specific Flow thru Door

72-inch
72-inch
132 persons
24.0 persons/min/foot eff. width
(Table 3-14.5, SFPE 3rd).

Effective width of 72 inch doors

72” -12” = 60” or 5 feet.

Maximum calculated flow through each doorway at ideal density would be:
24 persons/minute/foot effective width x 5 feet = 120 persons/minute
Assuming everyone is equally spaced through the art gallery and heads to the exit
at about the same time, it is estimated that to discharge 132 people from the art
gallery will take 132 people/120 people/minute = 1.1 minutes (66 seconds).

Front Lobby and Adjacent Rooms (less main theater population)
Maximum occupancy
Exit discharge door
Door to Art Gallery
Maximum flow through 72” door
The time to discharge 199 people:

199 persons
72-inch wide
72-inch wide
120 persons/minute

199 persons/120 persons per min = 1.66 minutes (99 seconds)
Longest distance to discharge door
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Maximum travel rate on flat surface

235 feet/minute
(Table 3-13.4 SFPE 4th)

Time to reach exit door:

80 feet/235 feet per min
= 0.34 minutes (20 seconds)

Assume minimal queuing at the front exit door when just considering these occupants.
Evacuation of the front lobby and adjacent rooms = 119 seconds.

Main Theater, Platform/Stage, and Adjoining Supply Rooms
Maximum occupant load

358 people*
170 fixed seats
50 moveable seats
48 people in lounge
90 people in platform/storage areas.

Exit doors
Space between fixed seat rows
Average distance seat to closest aisle
Aisle steps

Height of steps
Horizontal travel
Vertical descent
Stair travel for 7/11 stair

Total distance (horiz. + stairs)
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Two, 72-inch wide
18-inch
~12 feet.
Treads ~ 40”
Risers 7”
Three step bottom of each aisle
21” to main floor.
40 feet average
6 feet from top row
1.85 x vertical distance
1.85 x 6 = 11 feet
(Table 3-14.5, SFPE 4th).
51 feet for furthest seated person
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Speed on stairs is calculated using the equation:

S = k – akD
Where:

S = speed along line of travel
D = density (persons/unit area) (0.175 for ideal flow,
SFPE Handbook Figure 3-14.5)
K and a = constants (Table 3-14.2, SFPE 3rd ed.)
K = 212 for stairs,
a = 2.86 for speed in feet/min

Therefore, speed of travel on the stairs = 212 – (2.86)(212)(.175)
Approximately 106 feet / minute
Exit stairs width
Effective width

36”
24” (36” – 2x6”)

Eff. width x 18.5 persons/minute/foot e.w. = 37 people/minute
Assume 170 people in fixed seats divide equally between sets of steps
170 people / 37 people per min = 2.3 minutes (140 seconds)
to get people out of fixed seating and onto the main floor.
Travel distance / speed on stairs = Travel time
51 feet / 106 feet/min on stairs = 0.48 minutes (29 seconds)
A queue may form at the bottom three steps making the stair passage the limiting factor.
Time to clear fixed seating = 170 people / 37 people per min
Time = approximately 2.3 minutes (140 seconds)
Distance to the rear (north) exit
Distance to the rear (north) exit
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Travel speed on flat floor

235 feet/minute
(Table 3-14.4, SFPE, 3rd)
6 seconds
3 seconds

Travel time to north exit
Travel time to south exit

Remaining occupant load of
(stage hands/performers/lounge/
temp seating)

188 people

It is assumed these 188 people will divide evenly sending 94 people to each of the
two exit doors.
Maximum travel distance
Travel time to exits

50 feet approx.
50’ / 235’ per min = 0.33 minutes (20 seconds)

Width of Main Theater Doors

72-inches wide.

At maximum flow thru doors,
Time to pass thru doors

94 people / 120 people per minute

Time to pass = 0.78 minutes (47 seconds)
Time to travel to/thru exit doors = 47 secs + 20 secs = 67 seconds (1.1 mins)
That should be sufficient time for the 94 people to pass through each door before
the additional two groups of 85 people each to clear their respective sides of fixed seating
and head to the doors. Therefore, 179 people will likely not cause a queue to form.
It is assumed the 179 people exiting through the front lobby (85 from the fixed seating
and 94 from the stage) will possibly form a slight queue at the front exit discharge door
when joining the people from the front lobby.
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The second double door to the art gallery may cause minor queue if any will form at the
front exit discharge door since it will only take 106 seconds to fully evacuate the front
lobby.
Time from theater to front exit doors = 70 feet / 235 feet per min = 18 seconds

Time to evacuate fixed seating
Time to evacuate platform/stage or
temporary floor seating
Time from north steps to north exit door
Time from north steps to south exit door
Time to pass from south theater door
to front exit discharge

140 seconds (longest period)
67 seconds (to either door)
6 seconds
2 seconds
18 seconds

Total time to clear the main theater to rear exit or to front lobby (using both
theater exit doors) will be approximately 2 minutes and 25 seconds after people start
moving.
Additional time to reach front exit = 18 seconds
Time to evacuate main theater after movement starts = 2 mins 25 secs thru rear exit
2 mins 45 secs thru front exit
*This value is likely higher than occupancy loads experienced under normal use during
productions.
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Rear Theater and Platform/Stage
Storage Rooms
Max occupant load rear supply room
Exit Doors

3 people
72-inch man door
96-inch roll-up door

Rear Theater, Platform/Stage Area, Actor Spaces
Max occupant load
110 people
Rear Lobby, Dressing Rooms And Restrooms
Max occupant load

48 people.

Total Rear Wing Occupancy Load

161 people

REAR THEATER
Exits

72-inch
36-inch hallway
36-inch doorway into/thru
sprinkler room

Seating on platform
Max Platform Height
Max Horizontal travel
Max travel distance

60
2 feet above floor.
40 feet
~ 50 feet

Width of walkway to exit door

52 inches**

Boundary layer widths of walkway
Effective width of walkway

8”
(Table 3-13.1, SFPE Hbk 4th)
36” (52” – 2x8”)

Max Specific Flow

24 persons/min/foot eff. width
(Table 3-13.5, SFPE 4th)
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Flow thru walkway = 36” eff. width x 24 persons/min/ft eff. width
= 72 people/minute.
Time to pass thru walkway

= 110 persons / 72 persons per min
= 1.5 minutes

Average distance to main exit door
50 feet
Time to reach rear exit
= 50 ft / 235 ft per min
= 13 seconds
Limiting flow would be through the narrowed corridor next to the seating area.

Alternate option
Some people exit thru unmarked doorway behind the platform/stage into sprinkler
control room exit to the exterior.
The rear doorway is unmarked and typically blocked from the audience by the stage sets.
The only people likely familiar with that route are actors and theater workers.
If 10 people used the rear exit route through the sprinkler control room, it would only
reduce the time for the remainder of the people to evacuate via the main exit door by
about 7 seconds
Total alternative time of about 1 minute and 23 seconds.

Based on this information, is estimated the total time to evacuate the rear theater
using just the 72 inch main exit door will be approximately 1.5 minutes.

** This opening could serve as a chokepoint where queuing might be expected.
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Rear Lobby, Dressing and Restrooms
Max occupant load
Exit Door
Exit Door Capacity
Time to evacuate thru door =
Time to evacuate thru door =
Maximum travel distance
Time to cover max distance

48 people
72-inch
120 people/minute
48 people / 120 people per minute
0.4 minutes (24 seconds)
~ 50 feet
~ 13 seconds

Time to evacuate the rear lobby, dressing rooms and restrooms will be 24 seconds
after all pre-movement is complete if people are equally spaced in these rooms.

Second Floor Spaces
Max occupancy load
Exit Doors

211 people
36-inch at top of front stairs
36-inch bottom of front stairs
36-inch at top of rear stairs

Stair width

44 inches at front
44 inches at rear

Eff. Width of doors

24 inches
(Table 3-13.1 SFPE 4th)
48 persons/minute
(24 people/min/ft eff width)
(Table 3-13.5, SFPE 4th)

Flow thru doors

Flow on 7 / 11 stairs

18.5 persons/min/ft eff width
(Table 3-13.5, SFPE 4th)

Eff. Width of stairs

32 inches
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Flow down stairs

49.4 people/minute

Therefore, limit to flow in each staircase based upon size of doorways
Speed of travel on the stairs
For ideal density of people on stairs

106 ft / min

Stair speed = 212 – (2.86)(212)(0.175)

Calculated using the equation:

S = k – akD
where:

S = speed along line of travel
D = density (persons/unit area) (= 0.175 for ideal flow, SFPE
Figure 3-13.8)
K and a = constants (as per table 3-12.2, SFPE 4th)
K = 212 for stairs, and
a = 2.86 for speed in feet / min

Vertical distance over stairs
Landings or level path on stairs
Travel distance over front stair
& 12-foot vertical distance

12-foot
20 feet

Calculated using the equation:
Distance = 12’ x 1.85 = 22.2’ on treads + dist. on landings
(Table 3-13.5, SFPE 4th).
22.2 ft + 20 ft = 42.2 ft.
Total front stairway travel distance between floors = 42.2 feet
Travel speed on stairs
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Time on stairs

24 secs down front stairs
25 secs down rear stairs

Since people entering second floor do so through the front stairs, assumed most
will attempt to also exit along the same path. Since the door to the rear stairs is entered
from the second floor reception area, some people in that area might choose the rear stairs
to evacuate.
Weighted averages of time to the nearest door entrance to the top of the stairs are
calculated based upon the number of occupants of each room and the longest distance
from any compartment to that door traveled at a speed of 235 feet/min on the level
corridors (SFPE 4th, Table 3-13.4).
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Second Floor Egress Distances

Dance Studio 1
Dance Studio 2
Dance Studio 3
Dressing Room
Office
Reception
Sound Studio
Storage
Hallway
Restrooms

Max Walking Time to Top of Front Stairs
Max
Distance Speed
Time
Occupants
ft
ft/min
(secs)
90
108
235.0
28
42
28
235.0
7
48
38
235.0
10
13
58
235.0
15
2
78
235.0
20
3
35
235.0
9
3
38
235.0
10
1
20
235.0
5
6
25
235.0
6
3
8
235.0
2

Dance Studio 1
Dance Studio 2
Dance Studio 3
Dressing Room
Office
Reception
Sound Studio
Storage
Hallway
Restrooms

Max Walking Time to Top of Rear Stairs
90
40
235.0
10
42
35
235.0
9
48
56
235.0
14
13
28
235.0
7
2
25
235.0
6
3
10
235.0
3
3
55
235.0
14
1
50
235.0
13
6
25
235.0
6
3
42
235.0
11

Weighted Ave
11.76
1.42
2.21
0.91
0.19
0.13
0.14
0.02
0.18
0.03
16.99 secs
average
4.36
1.78
3.25
0.44
0.06
0.04
0.20
0.06
0.18
0.15
10.52 secs
average

Table 10: Calculations of weighted average to reach second floor stairs

Assumed 75% (158 people) use the front stairs and 25% (53 people) use rear stairs
Time to front stairs
Time down front stairs

18 secs
24 secs

Limiting flow at upper doorway

48 people/minute

24 seconds after the first person enter the stairs, they will pass through the exit
discharge. As the first person reaches the exterior, there will be 19 people in the stairway
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(24 seconds to travel stairs x 48 people per minute through the door) with 138 more
queued up at the top. From that point on it will take 2.9 minutes (138 people remaining /
48 people per minute to pass through door) to get the rest of the people in that queue out
the front door.
Thus, to evacuate 75% of the people out the front stairs will take:
17 seconds for first person to reach stairs
+
24 seconds for that person to reach exit discharge door
+
2.9 minutes to get all people in the queue into the stairs
+
24 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge.
=
4.0 minutes (239 seconds) to clear 75% of the maximum
occupant load through the front exit once they start moving.
Rear Stair Analysis
Number of people
Time to reach stairs
Time on stairs (see above)

53 people (25% of max)
11 secs
25 secs

At that time, there will be 19 people in the stairs and a queue of 33 at the top of
the stairs. It will take an additional 41 seconds (33 people / 48 people per min) for the
remaining people to enter the stairs at the top and then 25 more seconds for the last
person to reach the bottom. Then assuming there are no queues or bottlenecks of flow on
the ground floor, it will take the last person an additional 18 seconds to walk the
remaining approximately 70 feet to one of the exit discharge doors.
As with above, this totals:

+
+
+
+

11 seconds for first person to reach stairs
25 seconds for that person to reach the bottom of the stairs
41 seconds to get all those queued up into the stairs
24 seconds for the last person to reach the bottom of the stairs
18 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge.

Travel Time =
119 seconds after pre-movement time to clear 25% of the max
occupant load through the rear, emergency exit and out of the building.
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100% of 2nd Floor Max. Occupancy Load Uses the Rear Exit Door

+
+
+
+

11 seconds for first person to reach stairs
25 seconds for that person to reach the bottom of the stairs
4 minutes to get the 192 people queued up at the top door into
the stairs (19 people already on the stairs)
24 seconds for the last person to reach the bottom of the stairs
18 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge.

Travel Time =
5.3 minutes (318 seconds) after pre-movement time to clear 100%
of the maximum second floor occupant load through the rear, emergency exit and
out of the building.

50% of 2nd Floor Max. Occupancy Load Uses Each Exit Door
Time to reach ground floor thru rear door

36 secs

50% of the people out the front stairs will take:
17 seconds for first person to reach stairs
+
24 seconds for that person to reach exit discharge door
+
1.8 minutes to get the 87 people in the queue into the stairs
+
24 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge.
Travel Time =
2.9 minutes (174 seconds) after pre-movement time to clear 50%
of the maximum occupant load through the front exit outside the building.
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50% of the people out of the rear exit door & stairs:

+
+

11 seconds for first person to reach stairs
25 seconds for that person to reach the bottom of the stairs
1.8 minutes to get the 87 people queued up at the top door into
the stairs (19 people already on the stairs)

+

18 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge.

Travel Time =
3.1 minutes (187 seconds) after pre-movement time to clear 50%
of the maximum occupant load through the rear exit and out of the building.

If an evacuation of the first floor is already underway, any queuing of the second
floor occupants once they reach the first floor is dependent on things such as premovement times on the first and second floors.
It will take 4.0 minutes (239 seconds) to clear 75% of the max occupant load
departing through the front exit and about half that time, 2.0 minutes (119 seconds)
to clear 25% through the rear, emergency exit and out of the building. In order to
shorten the overall evacuation time from the second floor, more people should be
urged to use the rear emergency exit to minimize queuing at the front stairs.

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

195

100% of 2nd Floor Max. Occupancy Load Out of the Front Exit Door

If occupants of the second floor determine early on that there is a fire in the main theater
space or that the rear exit stairs are unusable, then all 211 people on the upper floor will
be forced to use the front stairs. Using a similar analysis as shown above, the time to
evacuate all 211 people through the front stairs will be:

+
+
+

17 seconds for first person to reach stairs
24 seconds for that person to reach exit discharge door
(191 people will remain queued at the top doorway)
239 seconds to get the remaining people into the stairs
24 seconds for the last person to reach the exit discharge.

Travel Time = 304 seconds (5.1 minutes) to clear all of the second floor maximum
occupant load through the front exit after movement begins

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

196

Appendix B
‘Center for the Arts’ Plans
During the evaluation of the Center for the Arts, no plans were located either with
the AHJ or with the onsite staff showing a detailed layout of the building. The following
drawings were generated from on-site inspections to offer a general idea of the
arrangement of the building as well as the fire protection systems. These do not portray
at a level of accuracy with which to make engineering decisions or judgments but only to
give the reader a general idea of how the building existed at the time of the review.

Floor Plans

Figure 87: First floor, south half layout of the Center for the Arts
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Figure 88: First floor, north half floor layout of the Center for the Arts (expanded)

Figure 89: Second floor layout for the Center for the Arts (expanded)
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Exit Configuration and Travel Paths

Figure 90: First floor (front half) exit layout
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Figure 91: First floor (front half) evacuation travel paths

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

200

Figure 92: First floor (rear half) exit layout
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Figure 93: First floor, rear theater evacuation travel paths

Figure 94: First floor, rear lobby & dressing room evacuation travel paths
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Figure 95: Second floor exit layout

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

203

Figure 96: Second floor evacuation travel paths
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Sprinkler System Layout

Figure 97: Plan view of the sprinkler system including most remote area

Figure 98: Elevation view of the sprinkler system looking east
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Figure 99: Elevation view of the sprinkler system in the main theater looking south

Figure 100: Elevation view of the sprinkler system in the main theater looking west
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Alarm Detection and Notification System

Figure 101: Fire alarm detection and notification system in the first floor front
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Figure 102: Fire alarm detection and notification system in the first floor rear wing
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Structural Wall Design Types/Ratings

Figure 103: Wall types in the front portion of the first floor

Figure 104: Wall types in rear portion of the first floor
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Figure 105: Wall types on the second floor
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Appendix C
‘Center for the Arts’ Photos

Figure 106: View of between seat rows on fixed seating platform in main theater
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Figure 107: Additional view of seat rows on fixed seating platform in main theater

Figure 108: View of exit aisle on fixed seating platform in main theater
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Figure 109: View of ventilation ducting and grills penetrating south wall of main theater
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Figure 110: Example of sealed penetration through south wall of main theater

Figure 111: Example of unsealed penetrations
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Figure 112: View of exposed rear exit from second floor entering main theater

Figure 113: View of rear exit from second floor taken from main platform/stage
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Figure 114: View of steps from fixed seating and north exit from main theater

Figure 115: View of steps from fixed seating and south exit from main theater

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

216

Figure 116: Alternate view of stacked chairs stored alongside south wall of main theater

Figure 117: Panorama of front lobby taken from south exit door of main theater
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Figure 118: Exit door from front lobby entrance of the Center for the Arts

Figure 119: View of main exit doorway from art gallery
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Figure 120: View of rear theater doorway opening from behind the platform/stage into
the sprinkler control room

Figure 121: Fire Department supply connection into sprinkler control room
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Figure 122: Sprinkler riser faceplate with hydraulic system requirements
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Figure 123: Sprinkler system riser valve arrangement

Figure 124: Sprinkler head arrangement adjacent to arched roof trusses
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Appendix D
Automatic Sprinkler System
Computerized Hydraulic Sprinkler Calculations

The following six pages are copies of computer calculations that were located in
the files of the local fire department. No copies of sprinkler design plans were available
to compare these calculations with a particular layout or the as-built arrangement.
Nonetheless, copies have been provided as reference. Backup hand calculations were
also performed. The results were quite close.
The water supply requirements calculated by the computer program were 495.8
gpm (including a 250 gpm hose allowance) at 53.7 psi.

Hand calculations estimated the

requirements to be 495.3 gpm at 49 psi. The available city water supply was 2400 gpm at
residual pressure of 60 psi.
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Hand Calculations

The following two pages are hand calculations to verify the water supply
requirements at the Center for the Arts based upon visual observations of the installed
system. Since no copies of actual plans were available and the applicability of the
computerized calculations could not be verified as to the final installation, this backup
calculation was performed.
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Automatic Sprinkler System Inspection, Testing &
Maintenance Requirements of NFPA 25
MAJOR
COMPONENT
CONTROL
VALVES

INSPECTION, TESTING,
MAINTENANCE ITEMS

FREQUENCY
Annually

NFPA 25
Reference
12.3.3.1

Open/Test
Monthly

12.3.2.1
12.3.2.1

Verify as accessible
Monthly
Wrenches/hand wheel
available

Annually

12.3.3.1

Weekly/
Monthly

13.3.2.1

Annually

5.2.6.1

Annually

12.3.4

Inspect gauges

Monthly

5.2.4.1

Gauges in good working
order

Quarterly
5 year test/replace

5.2.6

Name plate attached

Quarterly

5.2.7

Seismic bracing checked

Annually

3 foot clear space

Quarterly

Operated/Lubricated
Verify valve is free of leaks
/ locked

Identified with signs
Valve maintenance
RISER
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FIRE DEPT.
CONNECTION

Main drain test

Annually

Connection visible and
accessible

Quarterly

System back-flushed

Every 5 years

Couplings checked for
smooth rotation/undamaged

Quarterly

12.3.3.4,
12.2.2.6
13.2.5,
13.3.3.4
13.7.1

Quarterly

WATERFLOW
ALARM PANEL,
SUPERVISORY
AND TAMPER
SWITCHES AND
DEVICES

ABOVE
GROUND PIPES,

Couplings gaskets in place /
undamaged

Quarterly

ID signs in place

Quarterly

Verify valves are free of
leaks
Check valve components.
Inspect internally. Clean,
repair/replace

Every 5 years

Inspect to verify system is
free of damage

Quarterly

5.2.5

Waterflow alarm test

Quarterly

5.3.3.1,
13.2.6

Test system - Audible
alarm / visual signals
activate within 90 seconds.
Test system – Alarm
company receives signals
Free of leaks and corrosion

Annually

5.3.3 / 12.2.7
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FITTINGS, AND
SUPPORTS

Verify proper alignment

Annually

Verify free of external
loads

Annually
Annually

Verify hangers and seismic
bracing installed and
undamaged
Verify water filled pipes
not exposed to routine
freezing

SPRINKLERS

Obstructions and internal
inspection of piping
Free of corrosion, foreign
materials, paint and damage
Verify installed with
correct orientation

5.2.3

Annually
Every 5 years

14.2

Annually

5.2.1

Annually
Annually

Verify unobstructed flow
Annually
Verify proper spacing from
walls

Annually

Verify proper distance
between sprinklers

Annually

Verify proper deflector
distance from ceilings and
to storage below

Every 5 years

Verify if sprinklers are less
than 50 years old

Annually

Annually

Verify if there is a spare
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sprinkler head box with the
correct number of spare
sprinklers available
Verify spare sprinklers are
the same as used in system

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

235

Appendix E
Alarm System

Central Station Disposition of Alarm, Supervisory
and Trouble Signals

Section 3.3.240.1	
   defines	
   an	
   Alarm	
   Signal	
   as,	
   “A	
   signal	
   indicating	
   an	
  
emergency	
  condition	
  or	
  an	
  alert	
  that	
  requires	
  action.”	
  Section	
  26.3.7.1.2	
  states	
  that	
  
the	
  central	
  station	
  shall	
  perform	
  the	
  following	
  actions:	
  

“(1)	
  

Immediately	
  

retransmit	
  

the	
  

alarm	
  

to	
  

the	
  

communications	
   center.
(2)	
  	
  Dispatch	
  	
  a	
   runner	
  	
  or	
   technician	
  	
  to	
   the	
  	
  protected	
  	
  premises	
  	
  to	
   arrive	
  	
  
within	
  	
   2	
  hours	
   after	
   receipt	
   of	
   a	
   signal	
   if	
   equipment	
   needs	
   to	
   be	
   manually	
  
reset	
   by	
   the	
   prime	
   contractor.	
   Except	
   where	
   prohibited	
   by	
   the	
   authority	
  
having	
   jurisdiction,	
   the	
   runner	
   or	
   technician	
   shall	
   be	
   permitted	
   to	
   be	
  
recalled	
   prior	
   to	
   arrival	
   at	
   the	
   premises	
   if	
   a	
   qualified	
   representative	
   of	
   the	
  
subscriber	
   at	
   the	
   premises	
   can	
   provide	
   the	
   necessary	
   resetting	
   	
   of	
   	
   the	
  	
  
equipment	
   	
   	
   and	
   	
   is	
   	
   able	
   	
   to	
   	
   place	
   	
   the	
   	
   system	
   	
   back	
   	
   in	
   	
   operating	
  
condition.	
  
(3)	
  Immediately	
   notify	
  the	
  subscriber.	
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(4)	
   Provide	
  notice	
  to	
  the	
   subscriber	
  or	
   authority	
  having	
  jurisdiction,	
   or	
   both,	
  
if	
  required.”	
  

NFPA	
  72	
  states	
  that	
  central	
  station	
  operators	
  must	
  perform	
  these	
  actions	
  in	
  
the	
   order	
   given	
   and	
   must	
   do	
   so	
   to	
   properly	
   respond	
   to	
   the	
   intended	
   levels	
   of	
  
urgency	
  implied	
  by	
  an	
  alarm	
  activation.	
  	
   One	
  exception	
  in	
  this	
  case	
  is	
  that	
  a	
  runner	
  
might	
   not	
   be	
   needed	
   if	
   a	
   contractor	
   needs	
   to	
   manually	
   reset	
   equipment	
   at	
   the	
  	
  
premises.	
   	
   	
   	
   If	
   the	
   subscriber	
   or	
   another	
   trained	
   individual	
   from	
   the	
   Center	
   for	
  
the	
   Arts	
   or	
   elsewhere	
   is	
   trained	
   to	
   check	
  and	
  reset	
  the	
  system	
  and	
  is	
  directed	
  to	
  
do	
   so,	
   then	
   the	
   central	
   station	
   is	
   not	
   needed	
   to	
   respond.	
   	
   It	
   should	
   also	
   be	
   noted	
  
that	
  if	
  the	
  alarm	
  results	
  from	
  a	
  prearranged	
  test,	
  then	
  the	
  above	
  actions	
  are	
  clearly	
  
not	
  necessary.	
  
Similar	
   to	
   the	
   mandated	
   response	
   to	
   alarm	
   signals,	
   NFPA	
   72	
   dictates	
   the	
  
requirements	
   for	
   how	
   supervisory	
   signals	
   will	
   be	
   handled	
   by	
   the	
   central	
  
station.	
   Section	
  3.3.240.6	
  defines	
  a	
  	
   supervisory	
  	
   signal	
  	
   as	
  	
   “a	
  	
   signal	
  	
   indicating	
  	
  
the	
  	
   need	
  	
   for	
  	
   action	
  	
   in	
  connection	
  with	
  the	
  supervision	
  of	
  guard	
  tours,	
  the	
  fire	
  
suppression	
   systems	
   or	
   equipment,	
   or	
   the	
   maintenance	
   features	
   of	
   related	
  
systems.”	
  	
   Section	
  26.3.7.3	
  states	
  that,	
  “Upon	
  receipt	
  of	
  a	
  supervisory	
  signal	
  from	
  a	
  
sprinkler	
  system,	
  other	
  fire	
  suppression	
  system(s),	
  or	
  other	
  equipment,	
  the	
  central	
  
station	
  shall	
  perform	
  the	
  following	
  actions:	
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“(1)	
   Communicate	
   immediately	
   with	
   the	
   persons	
  designated	
  by	
  the	
   subscriber	
  
and	
   notify	
   the	
   fire	
   department	
   or	
   law	
   enforcement	
   agency,	
   	
   or	
   both,	
   when	
  
required	
  	
   by	
  the	
  authority	
   having	
  jurisdiction	
  
(2)	
   Dispatch	
   a	
   runner	
   or	
   maintenance	
   person	
   to	
   arrive	
   within	
   2	
   hours	
   to	
  
investigate	
  Exception:	
  	
   Where	
  the	
  supervisory	
  	
   signal	
  	
   is	
  	
  cleared	
  	
   in	
  	
  accordance	
  	
  
with	
  	
   a	
  	
  scheduled	
  procedure	
   determined	
   by	
  26.3.7.3(1).	
  
(3)	
   Notify	
   the	
   authority	
   having	
   jurisdiction	
   when	
   sprinkler	
   systems	
   or	
   other	
  
fire	
   suppression	
   systems	
   or	
   equipment	
   have	
   been	
   wholly	
   or	
   partially	
   out	
   of	
  
service	
   for	
  8	
  hours	
  
(4)	
   When	
   service	
   has	
   been	
   restored,	
   provide	
   notice,	
   if	
   required,	
   to	
   the	
  
subscriber	
   or	
  the	
  authority	
  having	
  jurisdiction,	
   or	
  both,	
  as	
   to	
   the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  
signal,	
   the	
   time	
   of	
   occurrence,	
   and	
   the	
   restoration	
   of	
   service	
   when	
  
equipment	
   has	
   been	
   out	
   of	
   service	
  for	
  8	
   hours	
  or	
  more.	
  
Exception:	
  	
   If	
   the	
  	
   supervisory	
  	
  	
  signal	
  	
   results	
  	
   from	
  	
   a	
  	
   prearranged	
  	
  	
  test,	
  	
   the	
  	
  
actions	
  specified	
   by	
  26.3.7.3(1),	
   (3),	
  and	
  (4)	
  shall	
  not	
  be	
  required.”	
  

In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  	
  above	
  provisions,	
  	
  NFPA	
  	
  72	
  	
  also	
  	
  provides	
  	
  guidance	
  	
  for	
  	
  
the	
   	
   central	
   	
   station	
   	
   to	
   respond	
   to	
   a	
   trouble	
   signal	
   which	
   it	
   defines	
   in	
   Section	
  
3.3.240.7	
  as	
  “A	
  signal	
  initiated	
  by	
  a	
  system	
  	
  or	
  	
  device	
  	
  indicative	
  	
  of	
  	
  a	
  	
  fault	
  	
  in	
  	
  a	
  	
  
monitored	
   	
   circuit,	
   	
   system,	
   	
   or	
   	
   component.”	
   Section	
   26.3.7.4	
   dictates	
   the	
  
requirements	
  for	
  trouble	
  signals	
  by	
  stating,	
  “Upon	
  receipt	
  of	
  trouble	
  signals	
  or	
  other	
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signals	
  pertaining	
  solely	
  to	
  matters	
  of	
  equipment	
  maintenance	
  of	
  the	
  alarm	
  systems,	
  
the	
  central	
  station	
  shall	
  perform	
  the	
  following	
  actions:	
  

“(1)	
  Communicate	
   immediately	
   with	
  persons	
   designated	
   by	
  the	
  subscriber,	
  
(2)	
   Dispatch	
   personnel	
   to	
   arrive	
   within	
   4	
   hours	
   to	
   initiate	
   maintenance,	
   if	
  
necessary.	
  
(3)	
   When	
   the	
   interruption	
   is	
   more	
   than	
   8	
   hours,	
   provide	
   	
   notice	
   	
   to	
   the	
  
subscriber	
   and	
   the	
   fire	
   department	
   if	
   so	
   required	
   by	
   the	
   authority	
   having	
  
jurisdiction	
   as	
   to	
   the	
   nature	
   of	
   the	
   interruption,	
   the	
   time	
   of	
   occurrence,	
   and	
  
the	
  restoration	
   of	
   service.”	
  
	
  

Since	
   trouble	
   signals	
   alert	
   the	
   central	
   station	
   to	
   the	
   alarm	
   system	
   being	
  
in	
   some	
  state	
  of	
  being	
  partially	
  or	
  completely	
  out	
  of	
  service,	
  it	
  is	
  imperative	
  that	
  the	
  
central	
   station	
   takes	
   action	
   to	
   assist	
   in	
   getting	
   the	
   system	
   back	
   in	
   working	
   order.	
  	
  	
  	
  
Paragraph	
   (2)	
   above	
   shows	
   the	
   importance	
   placed	
   on	
   insuring	
   that	
   a	
   technician	
  
trained	
  in	
  the	
  particular	
  system	
  is	
  dispatched	
  to	
  the	
  site	
  to	
  get	
  the	
  system	
  back	
  up	
  
into	
  working	
  condition	
  within	
  the	
  4	
  hour	
  limitation.	
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Inspection, Testing and Maintenance – Alarm System
COMPONENT	
  
Control	
  equipment	
  including	
  equipment	
  
monitored	
  for	
  alarm,	
  supervisory	
  and	
  
trouble	
  signals	
  including:	
   a)	
  fuses,	
   b)	
  
interfaced	
  equipment,	
  	
  c)	
  Lamps	
  and	
  
LEDs,	
  and	
  d)	
  Primary	
  power	
  supply	
  
Sealed	
  Lead	
  Acid	
  Batteries	
  

FREQUENCY	
  
Annually	
  

Semi-‐-‐-‐Annually	
  

Fire	
  Alarm	
  Unit	
  Trouble	
  Signals	
  

Semi-‐-‐-‐Annually	
  

Remote	
  Annunciators	
  

Semi-‐-‐-‐Annually	
  

Manual	
  Fire	
  Alarm	
  Boxes	
  

Semi-‐-‐-‐Annually	
  

Smoke	
  Detectors	
  

Semi-‐-‐-‐Annually	
  

Waterflow	
  Devices	
  

Quarterly	
  

Alarm	
  Notification	
  Devices	
  such	
  as	
  bells,	
  
horns	
  and	
  horn	
  strobes	
  

Semi-‐-‐-‐Annually	
  

Figure 125: Table 14.4.5, NFPA 72, Testing Frequencies
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The	
  following	
  testing	
  requirements	
  from	
  Table	
  14.4.5	
  apply	
  to	
  the	
  Center	
  for	
  
the	
  Art’s	
  system.	
  

COMPONENT
Control	
  equipment	
  including	
  equipment	
  
monitored	
  for	
  alarm,	
  supervisory	
  and	
  
trouble	
  signals	
  including:	
   a)	
  fuses,	
   b)	
  
interfaced	
  equipment,	
  	
  c)	
  Lamps	
  and	
  LEDs,	
  
and	
  d)	
  Primary	
  power	
  supply
Sealed	
  Lead	
  Acid	
  Batteries	
  used	
  as	
  
Secondary	
  Power	
  Supplies

Fire	
  Alarm	
  Unit	
  Trouble	
  Signals
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FREQUENCY

Annually

Replace	
  within	
  5	
  years	
  
after	
  
manufacture	
  or	
  more	
  
frequently	
  as	
  needed.	
  
	
  
Charge	
  and	
  discharge	
  tests	
  
should	
  be	
  conducted	
  
annually.	
  
	
  
Load	
  voltage	
  tests	
  should	
  
be	
  conducted	
  semi-‐-‐-‐
annually	
  
Annually.	
  	
  The	
  actual	
  
testing	
  
should	
  be	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  
Reference	
  10	
  of	
  Table	
  
14.4.2.2	
  of	
  NFPA	
  72
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Remote	
  Annunciators

Manual	
  Fire	
  Alarm	
  Boxes
Smoke	
  Detectors
Waterflow	
  Devices
Alarm	
  Notification	
  Devices	
  such	
  as	
  bells,	
  
horns	
  and	
  horn	
  strobes

Annually.	
  	
  The	
  actual	
  
testing	
  should	
  be	
  in	
  
accordance	
  with	
  
Reference	
  11	
  of	
  Table	
  14.4.2.2	
  
of	
  NFPA	
  72
Annually
Annually
Semi-Annually
Annually.	
  The	
  actual	
  
testing	
  
should	
  be	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  
Reference	
  15	
  of	
  Table	
  14.4.2.2	
  
of	
  NFPA	
  72

	
  
Section	
   14.5.2	
   of	
   NFPA	
   72	
   states	
   very	
   generically	
   that	
   the	
   frequency	
   of	
  
maintenance	
   and	
   cleaning	
   of	
   system	
   equipment	
   shall	
   depend	
   on	
   the	
   type	
   of	
  
equipment	
   and	
   the	
   local	
   ambient	
   conditions.	
   	
   	
   The	
   emphasis	
   of	
   the	
   section	
   is	
   on	
  
cleaning	
   of	
   the	
   equipment	
   which	
   it	
   suggests	
   be	
   conducted	
   in	
   accordance	
   with	
  
manufacturer’s	
  published	
  guidelines.	
  

Fire Detection Scenarios
Three fire detection scenarios were examined for fires occurring at places in the
Center for the Arts currently outfitted with alarms. The times estimated for alarm
activation were determined using either the computer zone fire model CFAST or a
spreadsheet analysis following the DETACT model. The specific calculations follow.
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First Fire Detection Scenario
The first scenario is a fire presumed to occur in the fire sprinkler
control room. The chance that a fire would occur in that room is small considering the
limited fuels there. One potential fire could result from a malfunction in the electrical
system powering the fire alarm control panel.

A medium growth rate fire was

assumed. The following additional assumptions are made for this scenario:

Ambient temperature

20°C

Fire growth rate

Slow

Ceiling height varies with slope. Max Height =

16 feet.

Height at sidewall:

11 feet.

Room size:

Approx. 70 square feet (5 feet x 14 feet)

Height of wall mounted smoke detector:

94 inches (2.4 m)

Average temperature rise to
correlate with a PVC fire source:
(According to Table B.4.7.5.3 NFPA 72)

7.2 °C

The zone fire model CFAST was run to estimate the time of detector activation
from a medium growth rate fire. The DETACT model was not appropriate for use
since the detector is wall mounted and DETACT applies to ceiling mounts. Although
the ceiling was slanted, an average height of 13.5 feet (4 m) was used to estimate upper
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layer filling time.

The time for the upper layer to descend down to the smoke detector

(94 inches, 2.4 m) with a slow growth fire was about 18 seconds. By that time, the
temperature of the upper layer would only have raised about 1 °C. Increasing the
temperature of the upper layer to 27.2 °C would take about 55 seconds.

At 55

seconds, the heat release rate of the fire would be approximately 10 kW.

Second Fire Detection Scenario
The second theoretical fire is located in the front lobby area of the Center for the
Arts. Two smoke detectors in the main lobby were evaluated for the time needed for
detection.

The following assumptions are made for this scenario:

Ambient temperature

20°C RTI – Smoke Detectors

Fire growth rate

Medium

Ceiling height

Radial distance

8 feet (2.4m) under drop ceiling. Ceiling
mounted smoke detectors

Detector 1 = 20 feet (6.1 m)
Detector 2 = 31 feet 8 inches (9.6 m)
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According to Table B.4.7.5.3 of NFPA 72, the highest temperature rise
associated with the activation of an ionization detector is with a wood fire source. That
occurred with a rise of 13.9 °C. For other fuels such as PVC or Polyurethane, the rise
would be 7.2 °C. In an effort to determine a conservative time for alarm activation, the
higher value of 13.9 °C was evaluated.
According to calculations completed with the spreadsheet for the model
DETACT, under these conditions, the detector located 20 feet away would activate at
about 95 seconds after ignition when the heat release rate was about 100-‐110 kW. The
second smoke detector, 31 feet away from the fire would be expected to activate 40
seconds later at 135 seconds when the heat release rate was around 220 kW. If PVC or
synthetic fuels such a polyurethane were involved, the closest detector would activate at
27.2°C about 60-‐65 seconds after ignition. At that time, the heat release rate would be
about 55 kW. The furthest detector would activate at about 75 seconds when the heat
release rate was around 70 kW.
	
  

Third Fire Detection Scenario
The third theoretical fire is located in the art gallery of the Center for the Arts.
The fire is estimated to start in a large, high-‐density polyethylene (HDPE) trash
container stored in the main gallery space for visitors’ use.
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be a medium growth rate fire. The wall-‐mounted smoke detector in the gallery was
evaluated for detection. The following assumptions are made for this scenario:

Ambient temperature

20°C

Room size

884 sq. ft. (82.3 sq. meters)

Fire growth rate

Medium

Ceiling height

12 feet, 6 inches (3.6 m) with three
bays, each 24 inches deep

Wall mounted smoke detector

30 inches (0.75 m) below ceiling

Necessary temperature rise

7.2 °C

Because the detector is wall mounted, the typical DETACT analysis is not
appropriate.

Instead, CFAST was used to determine the amount of time until the

smoke layer descended to the height of the detector. The fire source was based on
NIST tests of a HDPE trash can fire documented in figure 3-‐1.101 of the SFPE Handbook
(4th ed.).
According to Table B.4.7.5.3 of NFPA 72, the temperature rise associated with
the activation of an ionization detector from a synthetic fuel source would be 7.2 °C.
CFAST was used to determine the length of time it would take for an upper layer of
smoke to descend to the height of the smoke detector, 10 feet (3.0 m) above the floor and
to be at a minimum of 27.2°C.

With a medium growth rate fire, the upper smoke layer

would descend to 9.3 feet (2.8 m) above the floor at 50 seconds. Even so, at that time
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the temperature of the upper layer was estimated to only be 24 °C (assuming an
ambient of 20°C).

The 7.2 °C increase in the smoke layer temperature was not

achieved until approximately 65 seconds after ignition when the upper layer was
estimated to have descended to 7.9 feet (2.4 m) above the floor. At 50 seconds, the
HRR was estimated to be 30 kW. At 65 seconds, it would be approximately 50 kW.
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Appendix F
Sample FDS Input File
Scenario 1
The following is a sample of code used as an FDS5 input file to simulate Scenario 1 for a
fire burning in stacked chairs in the main theater. Because of the complexity of the file,
only a partial sample is included. The actual file’s more than 3,000 lines of obstruction
definitions were removed along with other repetitive data.

MainTheater3-spr.fds
Generated by PyroSim - Version 2012.1.0605
Apr 13, 2013 6:30:18 PM
&HEAD CHID='MainTheater3-spr', TITLE='Main Theater Fire 3 Plastic Chairssprinklered'/
&TIME T_END=300.0/
&DUMP RENDER_FILE='MainTheater3-spr.ge1', DT_RESTART=15.0/
&MESH ID='MESH', FYI='Outer Mesh', IJK=112,135,40, XB=0.0,22.5,0.0,29.0,0.0,9.0/
&REAC ID='POLYURETHANE',
FYI='NFPA Babrauskas',
C=6.3,
H=7.1,
O=2.1,
N=1.0,
SOOT_YIELD=0.1
CO_YIELD=0.05/
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&MISC CO_PRODUCTION = .TRUE. /
---------------SPRINKLER LINES--------------&PART ID='Water',
WATER=.TRUE.,
AGE=60.0,
SPECIFIC_HEAT=4.184,
MELTING_TEMPERATURE=0.0,
VAPORIZATION_TEMPERATURE=100.0,
HEAT_OF_VAPORIZATION=2259.0/
&PROP ID='Default_Water Spray02',
QUANTITY='SPRINKLER LINK TEMPERATURE',
ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=74.0,
PART_ID='Water',
K_FACTOR=21.0,
OPERATING_PRESSURE=0.9,
DROPLET_VELOCITY=5.0/
PROP ID='Default_Water Spray',
QUANTITY='SPRINKLER LINK TEMPERATURE',
ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=74.0,
PART_ID='Water',
FLOW_RATE=1.0,
DROPLET_VELOCITY=5.0/
&DEVC ID='SPRK', PROP_ID='Default_Water Spray02', XYZ=20.4,2.2,5.0,
ORIENTATION=0.0,0.4,1.0/
&DEVC ID='SPRK02', PROP_ID='Default_Water Spray02', XYZ=17.0,2.2,6.6,
ORIENTATION=0.0,0.3,1.0/

Additional repeating sprinkler definition lines removed for brevity
&DEVC ID='TIMER', QUANTITY='TIME', XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0, SETPOINT=30.0,
INITIAL_STATE=.TRUE./

Fire Protection Analysis of the ‘Center for the Arts’ Building

249

---------------MATERIAL PROPERTY LINES--------------&MATL ID='CONCRETE',
FYI='NBSIR 88-3752 - ATF NIST Multi-Floor Validation',
SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.04,
CONDUCTIVITY=1.8,
DENSITY=2280.0/
&MATL ID='YELLOW PINE',
FYI='Quintiere, Fire Behavior - NIST NRC Validation',
SPECIFIC_HEAT=2.85,
CONDUCTIVITY=0.14,
DENSITY=640.0/
&MATL ID='PAPER',
SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.4,
CONDUCTIVITY=0.05,
DENSITY=85.0,
HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=1.6E4/ Material to represent insulation facing
&MATL ID='FABRIC',
FYI='Covering for Upholstery',
SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.0,
CONDUCTIVITY=0.1,
DENSITY=100.0,
HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=2.0E4,
REFERENCE_TEMPERATURE=280,
HEAT_OF_REACTION=1000,
N_REACTIONS=1,
NU_FUEL=1/
&MATL ID='FOAM',
FYI='Caution: Reaction Rate Not Validated, remaining data from Jukka Hietaniemi,
et al., "FDS simulation of fire spread..."',
SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.0,
CONDUCTIVITY=0.05,
DENSITY=60.0,
HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=2.54E4,
N_REACTIONS=1,
HEAT_OF_REACTION=1250.0,
NU_FUEL=1.0,
REFERENCE_TEMPERATURE=280.0/
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&MATL ID='GLASS',
SPECIFIC_HEAT=0.84,
CONDUCTIVITY=50.0,
DENSITY=2700.0/
&MATL ID='CURTAIN',
SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.0,
CONDUCTIVITY=0.1,
DENSITY=50.0,
HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=1.0E4,
HEAT_OF_REACTION=2500,
REFERENCE_TEMPERATURE=400,
N_REACTIONS=1,
NU_FUEL=1/ Representing theatrical curtains. Estimated values
&MATL ID='HDPE',
SPECIFIC_HEAT=2.0,
CONDUCTIVITY=0.4,
DENSITY=750.0,
HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=3.5E4,
REFERENCE_TEMPERATURE=350,
HEAT_OF_REACTION=1500,
NU_FUEL=1,
N_REACTIONS=1/ Representing plastic material for thermoplastic chairs.
Estimated values
---------------SURF LINES--------------&SURF ID='CONCRETE',
COLOR='GRAY 80',
MATL_ID(1,1)='CONCRETE',
MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0,
THICKNESS(1)=0.2/
&SURF ID='WOOD',
RGB=51,51,0,
MATL_ID(1,1)='YELLOW PINE',
MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0,
THICKNESS(1)=0.01,
IGNITION_TEMPERATURE=250/
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&SURF ID='PAPER',
COLOR='GRAY 80',
BACKING='INSULATED',
MATL_ID(1,1)='PAPER',
MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0,
THICKNESS(1)=0.001/ Exposed facing of insulation on ceiling finish
&SURF ID='UPHOLSTERY',
RGB=204,153,0,
MATL_ID(1,1)='FABRIC',
MATL_ID(2,1)='FOAM',
MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0,
MATL_MASS_FRACTION(2,1)=1.0,
THICKNESS(1:2)=0.003,0.1/
&SURF ID='GLASS',
COLOR='CYAN',
MATL_ID(1,1)='GLASS',
MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0,
THICKNESS(1)=0.005,
THICKNESS=.005/
&SURF ID='CURTAIN',
RGB=0,0,153,
MATL_ID(1,1)='CURTAIN',
MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0,
THICKNESS(1)=0.006/ Representing theatrical curtains. Estimated values
&SURF ID='BURNER',
COLOR='RED',
HRRPUA=1500.0,
TAU_Q=-60.0/
&SURF ID='PLASTIC',
RGB=0,204,51,
MATL_ID(1,1)='HDPE',
MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0,
THICKNESS(1)=0.01/
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---------------OBSTRUCTION LINES--------------&OBST XB=18.75,19.0,24.25,24.5,0.0,0.5, SURF_ID='UPHOLSTERY'/ Upholstery
&OBST XB=18.5,18.75,24.25,24.5,0.0,0.5, SURF_ID='UPHOLSTERY'/ Upholstery
.
.
.

Approximately 3,000 additional obstruction lines removed for brevity.

---------------DOORWAY LINES--------------&HOLE XB=7.0,7.9,20.225,20.625,2.5,4.5/ Doorway to N stage high storage
&HOLE XB=10.3,10.9,1.5,2.25,10.2,10.6/ Hole
---------------BURNER LINE--------------&VENT SURF_ID='BURNER', XB=19.7,20.7,2.4,3.4,0.2,0.2, IOR=3, RGB=255,0,51/
Burner
---------------OUTPUT LINES--------------&BNDF QUANTITY='BURNING RATE'/
&BNDF QUANTITY='GAUGE HEAT FLUX'/
&BNDF QUANTITY='WALL TEMPERATURE'/
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBX=10.5/
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBX=13.0/
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBX=20.0/
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBY=2.5/
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBY=4.5/
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBY=12.0/
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBY=18.5/
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBZ=1.8/
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&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBX=10.5/
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBX=13.0/
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBX=20.0/
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBY=2.5/
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBY=4.5/
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBY=18.5/
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBZ=1.8/
&DEVC XYZ = 13.0, 1.9, 1.8, ID='South6fttemp', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/
&DEVC XYZ = 13.0, 1.9, 1.8, ID='South6ftvis', QUANTITY= 'VISIBILITY'/
&DEVC XYZ = 13.0, 1.9, 1.88, ID='South6ftCO', QUANTITY= 'VOLUME
FRACTION', SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide'/
&DEVC XYZ = 10.0, 24.6, 1.8, ID='North6fttemp', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/
&DEVC XYZ = 10.0, 24.6, 1.8, ID='North6ftvis', QUANTITY= 'VISIBILITY'/
&DEVC XYZ = 10.0, 24.6, 1.8, ID='North6ftCO', QUANTITY= 'VOLUME
FRACTION', SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide'/
&DEVC XYZ = 6.5, 1.9, 5.5, ID='Upper6fttemp', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/
&DEVC XYZ = 6.5, 1.9, 5.5, ID='Upper6ftvis', QUANTITY= 'VISIBILITY'/
&DEVC XYZ = 6.5, 1.9, 5.5, ID='Upper6ftCO', QUANTITY= 'VOLUME FRACTION',
SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide'/
&DEVC XYZ = 4.4, 12.0, 2.4, ID='Stage6fttemp', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/
&DEVC XYZ = 4.4, 12.0, 2.4, ID='Stage6ftvis', QUANTITY= 'VISIBILITY'/
&DEVC XYZ = 4.4, 12.0, 2.4, ID='Stage6ftCO', QUANTITY= 'VOLUME
FRACTION', SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide'/
&DEVC XYZ = 17.0, 2.9, 6.75, ID='CeilingWestofPlume', QUANTITY=
'TEMPERATURE'/
&DEVC XYZ = 20.2, 2.9, 5.3, ID='CeilingatPlume', QUANTITY= 'TEMPERATURE'/
&TAIL /
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